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CRITICIZING JUDGES: A LAWYER’S
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.*
Lawyers, as officers of the court, are expected to act with
deference and respect toward judges. Speaking sharply to or
publicly criticizing members of the bench is frowned upon and
not infrequently met with punitive responses. The judiciary,
however, is not above reproach. Judges are fallible and may
possess personal biases, tainting self-interest, or even prejudice.
As such, at times, they must disqualify themselves if their
ability to dispense justice fairly and impartially can reasonably
be questioned. Indeed, the very nature of a judge’s role requires
avoidance of even the “appearance of impropriety.” When
judges fail to adhere to this standard, decisional accuracy is
called into question, and the perception of fairness, so
important to the judicial process, is diminished.
Judges have broad discretion in deciding whether to
disqualify themselves, and legal review of those decisions is
limited, especially when made by a state’s highest court. In
Georgia, for example, if a supreme court justice declines to
recuse, there is no avenue for appellate review and mandamus
relief is unavailable. Hence, a lawyer’s only meaningful
recourse may be to publicly criticize the justice, making others
aware of perceived wrongful conduct. Such a response,
however, is substantially dissuaded in virtually every U.S.
jurisdiction by Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which subjects lawyers to discipline for knowingly or recklessly
making a false statement “concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge.” While facially narrow, the rule is widely
*
A. Gus Cleveland Distinguished Chair of Legal Ethics and Professionalism & Josiah
Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I would first
like to thank Professors Dan Coenen and Bruce Green for their very helpful insights,
suggestions, and questions regarding earlier drafts of this article. In addition, I am greatly
indebted to my amazing research assistants Kristen Bartlett and Sarah Nelson for their
extensive research and substantive input throughout the article’s evolution. Lastly, I thank
my wife Kim for unfailingly making everything that I attempt better.
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interpreted to cover far more criticism than the text would
suggest. Only Georgia and the District of Columbia have
declined to adopt Rule 8.2(a), choosing instead to accord
greater latitude to the free-speech rights of lawyers. In this
article, I argue that such an approach is more consistent with
and supportive of lawyers’ ethical duties to their clients, the
judicial system, and the public, and therefore should serve as
the regulatory prototype.
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“The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises
the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized
American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always
with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
In American society, judges have traditionally been viewed as
wise and impartial arbiters of legal disputes, doling out justice from
elevated benches while garbed in regal black robes. Judges’ status
alone entitles them to respect and great deference. Citizens
obediently acquiesce to their will and judgment in a manner similar
to that of royal subjects to a king or queen. Lawyers, in particular,
are expected to adhere to this hierarchical paradigm, reverently and
submissively addressing judges as “your honor” and routinely
prefacing in-court statements with “may it please the court.”
Speaking sharply to or publicly criticizing a judge is anathema to
our justice system, and lawyers who do so are not infrequently met
with punitive responses from the bench2 and outrage from members
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (footnote omitted).
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 601–02 (1986) (“[A] current that runs
through some judicial opinions is that all lawyer criticism of judges creates public disrespect
for the law or the judiciary and thus should be sanctioned without careful regard for its truth
or falsity, possibly because the tone of criticism rather than its factual content is considered
objectionable.” (footnotes omitted)); Dara Kam, ‘Grim Reaper’ Attorney Daniel Uhlfelder in
Hot Water over Comments, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Feb. 12, 2021, 3:03 PM),
https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2021/02/12/grim-reaper-attorney-daniel-uhlfelderhot-water-over-comments/6742127002/ (describing a Florida appeals court’s finding that a
lawyer potentially committed criminal contempt and violated Florida ethics rules when he
suggested in a public statement that the court’s decision in his appeal was politically
motivated); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 641 (1985) (“[Petitioner’s] refusal to show
continuing respect for the court and his refusal to demonstrate a sincere retraction of his
admittedly ‘harsh’ statements are sufficient to demonstrate to this court that he is not
presently fit to practice law in the federal courts.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Snyder,
734 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1984), rev’d 472 U.S. 634 (1985))); In re Mahoney, 280 Cal. Rptr.
3d 2, 5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (holding an attorney in contempt for implying in an appellate
brief that the lower court’s decision was politically influenced and for impugning the lower
court’s integrity through a seeming comparison of it to Attorney Thomas Girardi, who had
been accused of various high-profile ethical transgressions); Howard v. Offshore Liftboats,
LLC, No. 13-4811, 2016 WL 2865889, at *9 (E.D. La. May 17, 2016) (sanctioning a lawyer
$1,000 for statements questioning the court’s integrity that were found to run afoul of Rules
1
2
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of the bar.3 In addition, such behavior may subject lawyers to
professional discipline if their statements falsely or recklessly
impugn a judge’s qualifications or integrity.4
Notwithstanding the traditional judge-lawyer dynamic and the
established regulatory limitations, the judiciary is not, and should
not be, above reproach.5 Judges are as fallible as anyone else and
may possess personal biases, tainting self-interest, or even
prejudice. As such, at times, they must disqualify themselves if
their ability to dispense justice fairly and impartially can
reasonably be questioned.6 Indeed, the very nature of a judge’s role
8.2 and 3.5 of Louisiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 485‒
88 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the reciprocal disbarment by the Northern District of Illinois of
an attorney who accused judges of numerous criminal and other wrongful acts).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text; Julie Hilden, Should Lawyers Be
(Sept.
21,
2009),
Allowed
to
Blog
Critically
About
Judges?,
FINDLAW
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/should-lawyers-be-allowed-to-blog-criticallyabout-judges.html (“Attorney bloggers who cross the line when it comes to wording [critical
of judges] should face backlash, but from their more decorous colleagues and fellow bloggers
— not from a quasi-governmental entity such as the bar . . . .”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Accused
of ‘Outrageous and Unfounded Attacks’ on SCOTUS Chief Justice, Pro-Trump Lawyer Stands
by Claims, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 11, 2021, 2:16 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/protrump-lawyer-l-lin-wood-stands-by-wild-claims-about-chief-justice (discussing how an
attorney asked a judge to revoke attorney L. Lin Wood’s pro hac vice admission in a New York
case because, among other things, he had made “outrageous and unfounded attacks” on Chief
Justice Roberts).
4 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall not
make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth
or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .”).
5 See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 601 (“[T]he law gives ‘[j]udges as persons or courts as
institutions . . . no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.’”
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 839 (1978))); see also Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487 (“Judges should hesitate to insulate
themselves from the slings and arrows that they insist other public officials face . . . .” (citing
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964))).
6 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: . . . The judge has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer . . . .”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”); id. § 455(b)
(providing for disqualification when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party”); U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 868 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Trott, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Anything less than this antiseptic approach to judging
undermines public confidence in our system of justice, and without public confidence in the
basic fairness of our system, it would soon crumble.”).
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requires the avoidance of even the “appearance of impropriety.”7
When judges fail to adhere to this standard, the legitimacy of a
given decision is subject to skepticism, and the perception of
fairness, so important to our legal process, is diminished.
In Georgia and elsewhere, judges have broad discretion in
making recusal decisions, especially at the supreme court level.8
Georgia justices decide recusal motions themselves,9 and there is no
requirement that they supply any explanation for their recusal or
non-recusal.10 Furthermore, when a justice declines to recuse, there
is no avenue for appellate review,11 nor is the extraordinary remedy
of mandamus available to force recusal.12 Does this mean that a
Georgia justice is completely immune from professional scrutiny
regarding matters of this nature? In terms of obtaining a judicial

7 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A judge shall uphold
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” (emphasis added)).
8 See, e.g., infra note 76 and accompanying text; see also GREGORY C. SISK ET AL., LEGAL
ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1009 (2018) (“When a
party files a motion to disqualify, the most common approach is for the subject judge to review
the motion on the merits.”).
9 See GA. SUP. CT. R. 26 (“A Justice whose impartiality is questioned will determine, alone
or in consultation with the other Justices, whether to grant or deny the motion to disqualify
or to disqualify himself or herself from or not participate in the case voluntarily, rendering
the motion moot. The criteria for disqualification are set forth in statutory law, case law, and
the Code of Judicial Conduct.”); O.C.G.A. § 15-1-8 (2021) (providing baseline rules for
disqualification); GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (2021) (delineating circumstances
that require a judge’s disqualification).
10 Although there is no express requirement that judges explain the basis for recusal or
non-recusal, Rule 2.11(C) permits judges disqualified under Rule 2.11(A) to disclose the basis
for their disqualification and ask the parties and lawyers to consider waiving the
disqualification, provided the basis of the disqualification is not “personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party.” GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(C) (2021); see also GA. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 2 (2021) (“Judges should disclose on the record, or in open court,
information that the court believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the
question of disqualification, even if they believe there is no legal basis for disqualification.”);
Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, 62 MERCER L. REV. 215, 231–32 (2010) (describing “the
unusual step” Justice Nahmias took by “explaining why he chose to recuse himself from all
cases in which the firm of King & Spalding” was counsel: because familial ties created the
potential that his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).
11 See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
12 See Clark v. Hunstein, 733 S.E.2d 259, 262 (Ga. 2012) (finding that “[n]othing in
[Georgia’s] Constitution suggests that this Court can mandamus itself or its Justices” and
holding that “mandamus does not lie against this Court or its Justices”).
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remedy, the answer appears to be “yes.” However, there are two
potential extrajudicial options available.
First, if the refusal to recuse is egregious enough, a lawyer may
file a disciplinary complaint against the justice with the Judicial
Qualifications Commission based on an arguable violation of Rule
2.11(A) of Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct,13 which mandates the
disqualification of judges under specific circumstances.14 The other
possibility, contrary to the tradition of deference and respect, is for
a lawyer to criticize a justice openly in order to bring any perceived
impropriety to the public’s attention.15 The latter approach was
taken by the lawyers in Barrow v. Raffensperger.16
In Raffensperger, three of nine justices ultimately refused to
recuse themselves in an appeal involving the procedure for
replacing a resigning, but still sitting, justice.17 The specific issue
presented was whether Justice Keith Blackwell’s announced
resignation, to take effect eight months later, allowed for his
position to be filled by gubernatorial appointment, rather than the
expected general nonpartisan election.18 The lawyers for the lead
appellant John Barrow responded to the recusal decision by sharply
criticizing the non-recusing justices in the media.19 Barrow, also a
lawyer and one of the would-be candidates for the court seat at
issue, was even more condemnatory in rebuking the justices,
13
See
Functions
&
Procedures,
G A.
JUD.
QUALIFICATIONS
COMM’N,
https://gajqc.gov/functions-and-procedures (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (describing the
procedure for filing an ethical complaint against a judge in Georgia).
14 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(1) (2021) (requiring disqualification “in any
proceeding in which [a judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, or in
which . . . “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice”). While filing such a disciplinary
complaint is possible, “reporting [a judge] is not a remedy likely to bring effective reaction in
many jurisdictions.” WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 601.
15 See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 601 (noting that because of the absence of other effective
remedies, “lawyers may feel strong motivation to resort to the scourge of publicity to expose
perceived judicial corruption, autocracy, or incompetence”).
16 842 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 2020); see infra Part III.
17 See Robin McDonald, State Supreme Court Splits in Recusing on Fight over Justice
Blackwell’s Seat, DAILY REP. (Mar. 23, 2020, 10:03 AM) [hereinafter, McDonald, Court Splits
in Recusing], https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/03/23/state-supreme-court-splitson-recusing-in-fight-over-justice-blackwells-seat/ (“Justices John Ellington, Nels Peterson,
Michael Boggs and Charles Bethel have recused, in addition to Blackwell himself. There is
also one unfilled vacancy on the court. Chief Justice Harold Melton, Presiding Justice David
Nahmias and Justice Sarah Warren did not recuse . . . .”).
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part III.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

168

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:161

especially Presiding Justice David Nahmias.20 In addition to
questioning the appropriateness of Nahmias’s refusal to recuse,
Barrow also took the opportunity to denounce Nahmias generally
for his alleged domineering style on the bench and suggested that
the Presiding Justice was using his authority improperly to obtain
a desired result in Barrow’s appeal.21
In this article, I examine whether the judicial criticism lodged by
Barrow and other lawyers was ethically proper, and I address the
broader question of whether lawyers criticizing judges is a systemic
necessity warranting a sweeping expansion of their ability to
engage in this form of speech. Currently, the applicable ethical rule
in every U.S. jurisdiction, except Georgia and the District of
Columbia, is consistent with Rule 8.2(a) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,22 which generally prohibits a lawyer from
knowingly or recklessly making a false statement “concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge.”23 Georgia expressly declined
to include this provision in its version of the rules of professional

20 See Jim Galloway, Opinion, John Barrow and the Brewing Fight over A Vanished
J.-CONST.
(May
5,
2020),
Supreme
Court
Race,
ATLANTA
https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/opinion-john-barrow-and-the-brewing-fight-over-vanishedsupreme-court-race/zjWVMo8OW8TlTpvun3uCyN/ (expounding on Barrow’s criticisms of the
justices and explaining that “[i]nside and outside the courtroom, Barrow has alleged collusion
and manipulation”).
21 Barrow publicly stated that “Nahmias is notorious for his attempts to dominate the
Court. His refusal to step aside in this case is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. . . .
I’m concerned that Justice Nahmias may be trying to manipulate the substitute justices for
the same reason Justice Blackwell and the Governor have manipulated the timing of Justice
Blackwell’s ‘retirement’ — to control the Georgia Supreme Court.” Jim Galloway, Tia Mitchell
& Greg Bluestein, The Jolt: Georgia GOP Cancels State Convention, Rewrites Delegate
Selection Process, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/thejolt-georgia-gop-cancels-state-convention-rewrites-delegate-selectionprocess/xpdTVXwrtb00RBSRtf6IwK/; see also R. Robin McDonald, John Barrow Accuses Ga.
Supreme Court of ‘Slow Walking’ Ruling on Justice Blackwell’s Seat, DAILY REP. (Apr. 13,
2020,
6:36
PM)
[hereinafter
McDonald,
Slow
Walking],
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/04/13/john-barrow-accuses-ga-supreme-courtof-slow-walking-ruling-on-justice-blackwells-seat/ (expounding on Barrow’s statements about
Justice Nahmias); infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
22 See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES
OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT:
RULE
8.2
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/m
rpc_8_2.pdf (listing each state’s version of Model Rule 8.2).
23 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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conduct adopted in 2001,24 even though its version is principally
fashioned after the ABA’s Model Rules.25 Given this departure from
the Model Rules, are Georgia lawyers freer to criticize the judiciary
than lawyers licensed in other states? In my view, the answer is a
qualified “yes.” Members of the bar in Georgia do have more ethical
room to criticize judges, but that room is not without limits. Even in
the absence of Rule 8.2(a), there are ethical restrictions and
practical considerations that appropriately constrain the form and
manner of judicial criticism by lawyers.
Part II introduces this subject by discussing the background of
Barrow v. Raffensperger, which supplies essential context for
assessing the propriety of lawyers’ criticism of judges. Part III then
details the actual statements made by the lawyers in that case along
with the public responses to their critiques by other members of the
bar. In addition, Part III addresses the efficacy and potential factual
accuracy of these lawyers’ statements. Part IV explores the
historical development and current state of the Model Rules in
relation to judicial criticism by contrast to the seemingly more

24 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 (2021) (leaving Rule 8.2(a) as “[r]eserved”); see
also GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 1 (2021) (“Assessments by lawyers are relied on
in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or
appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting
attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters
contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a
lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.”). As noted,
the District of Columbia likewise declined to adopt Rule 8.2(a) and, in fact, declined to adopt
Rule 8.2 in its entirety. See COMMENTS OF THE SECTION ON COURTS, LAWYERS, AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE D.C. BAR REGARDING PROPOSED RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 17 (1988) (copy on file with the author) (stating that a minority of
the Section agreed with the omission of Rule 8.2(a) and that “[l]awyers are no less citizens
than are nonlawyers, and should be no less entitled to criticize judges — indeed, they are
often the only citizens with the knowledge and ability effectively to do so.”); see also AM. BAR
ASS’N CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 22 (noting that D.C. did not adopt Rule
8.2). This article, however, will focus solely on Georgia, with the understanding that much of
the analysis, by extension, should apply to D.C. lawyers as well, but because D.C. judges are
appointed, rather than elected, some considerations related to Rule 8.2 will necessarily differ.
25 At present, all states have adopted rules of professional conduct based, in varying
degrees, on the ABA Model Rules. See Jaliz Maldonado, California Aligns New Rules with
(Aug.
29,
2018),
ABA
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct,
NAT’L L. REV.
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-aligns-new-rules-aba-rules-professionalconduct (indicating that in 2018 California joined the other 49 states in adopting a version of
rules of professional conduct closely following or modeled after the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
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lenient standards applicable in Georgia. In Part V, I assess the
ethical propriety of the lawyers’ statements in Raffensperger under
Georgia’s unique, free-speech-friendly regulatory regime, which
includes various rules of professional conduct that legitimately
restrict certain types of judicial criticism—for example, criticism
that “would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure” a judge.26
This analysis reveals that the lawyers in Raffensperger were on
solid ethical ground in issuing their criticism, at least from the
standpoint of the blackletter ethical rules.
Indeed, Raffensperger presents a paradigmatic example of a
situation in which lawyers should not only be rather liberally
permitted to publicly criticize members of the judiciary but actually
must do so in order to effectively represent their clients and serve
the broader public interest.27 To the latter point, most judges in
Georgia, although often initially appointed by the governor to fill
mid-term vacancies, eventually endure a nonpartisan election.28 In
such a system, it is essential that judges be held publicly
accountable for their decisions and their actions, and lawyers are
best equipped to assess those matters in a well-informed and
thoughtful manner.29
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(a) (2021).
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under
the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 871 (1998) (observing that “attorney speech often
serves to advance the interests of the client and the interests of society”).
28 See Barrow v. Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d 884, 892–94 (Ga. 2020) (discussing Georgia’s
selection process for supreme court justices); id. at 896 (noting that “the appointment
mechanism for initial service of Justices provided in Paragraphs III and IV [of the 1983
Georgia Constitution] has been the norm, not the exception, in the more than 35 years that
we have lived under this Constitution: of the 18 Justices who first took office during that
time, all but one — Justice John J. Ellington — was initially appointed by a Governor to fill
a vacancy”); Judicial Selection in the States: Georgia, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=GA (last visited Nov. 23,
2021) (providing a succinct overview of Georgia’s judicial selection procedure). It should be
noted that the judge of Georgia’s recently-created State-wide Business Court is appointed to
a five-year term by the governor with the approval of a majority of the judiciary committees
of both the Georgia House and Senate. O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-7 (2021).
29 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1056–57 (1991) (“To the extent the press
and public rely upon attorneys for information because attorneys are well informed, this may
prove the value to the public of speech by members of the bar.”); WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at
601 (“Lawyers possess special knowledge and legal training that gives [sic] them a unique
ability to assess the performance of judges.”); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned:
The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1601
26
27
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Without such professional scrutiny and commentary, clients
would be ill-served and the electorate underinformed about factors
bearing on a judge’s suitability for office.30 While judicial criticism
by lawyers is important in jurisdictions like Georgia in which judges
are primarily elected, it may actually be even more necessary in
appointment-only systems, such as at the federal level or in the
District of Columbia,31 because such criticism may be the most
consequential way for a lawyer to ensure meaningful public and

(2009) (“Because lawyers have the education and training to recognize, understand, and
articulate problems with the judiciary, and are regularly exposed to and experiencing those
problems as they bring their clients’ cases before judges, they have more expertise and are
better able to comment on the judiciary and judicial qualifications.”); see also id. at 1575
(noting that “speech regarding the qualifications and integrity of members of the judiciary is
essential for democracy to function properly and cannot be suppressed merely to protect
judicial reputation”); Sandra M. Molley, Note, Restrictions on Attorney Criticism of the
Judiciary: A Denial of First Amendment Rights, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 489, 489 (1981)
(arguing that “attorneys are particularly suited to serve as a check on the judiciary” given
that they “operate within the legal system, understand the judicial process, and are familiar
with individual judges”). But see Hal R. Lieberman, Should Lawyers Be Free to Publicly
Excoriate Judges?, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 785, 796 (1997) (maintaining that “[i]f lawyers’
statements are accorded greater attention and credence than comments by others, then
lawyers can also do far more damage to a judge’s professional reputation by making
unwarranted attacks”).
30 See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 601 (“If lawyers were reluctant to call public attention to
judicial shortcomings, most incompetent or corrupt judges would probably remain
unchastened on the bench.”); see also State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d
958, 967 (Okla. 1988) (“Without question, foreclosing the public’s receipt of speech concerning
the governmental function of the courts forestalls the public’s access to the thoughts of the
very class of people in daily contact with the judicial system.”); Tarkington, supra note 29, at
1577 (“In order to vote with informed judgment, citizens should be free to make and obtain
opinions and information regarding . . . candidates [for judicial office].”); W. Bradley Wendel,
Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 337 (2001) (contending that “the
location of the judiciary within a democratic political order counsels against processes of
mystification, by which the workings of the court system are obscured from public view and
criticism”); cf. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978) (noting that
“speech cannot be punished when the purpose is simply ‘to protect the court as a mystical
entity or the judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and
spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed’” (quoting
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
31 See D.C. Code § 1-204.33 (2013) (describing the nomination and appointment procedure
for D.C. courts); FAQs: Federal Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-federaljudges (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (describing the process for federal judicial appointments).
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regulatory oversight of otherwise insulated problematic judicial
behavior.32
The article concludes by making the case for widespread
relaxation of regulation of lawyers’ criticism of judges, thereby
freeing them to fulfill in a better way their professional
responsibility to their clients and the public. To be sure, such
criticism should not be wholly unbridled because lawyers can go too
far. First, there are, and appropriately so, limits to the protection
afforded under the First Amendment. For example, it is well settled
that lawyers may be held legally accountable for making statements
about a judge that are known to be false or uttered with reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements.33 The same is
true with regard to public criticism that a “lawyer knows or
reasonably should know . . . will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”34 In addition, if
the criticism does not relate to pending litigation or is made by a
lawyer not involved in the case, it can be limited to the extent that
it “pose[s] a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.”35
Furthermore, lawyers can appropriately be called upon to issue
their judicial criticism in a professional and respectful manner,

32 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1636 (“Where the judiciary is appointed, the judiciary
must remain in the scrutiny of the public so that abuses and incompetence can be checked
and, where necessary, steps can be taken to remove judges.”).
33 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282–83 (1964) (holding that for a public
official to prove they were defamed, the statement must have been made with “actual
malice”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (extending Sullivan’s holding
to criminal sanctions for criticisms of the official conduct of public officials).
34 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (2021); see also Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036–37 (noting
that the restriction on lawyer speech contained Rule 3.6 is not inherently unconstitutional if
“[i]nterpreted in a proper and narrow manner”). For an example of various other ethical rules,
consistent with constitutional protections, that appropriately curtail the nature of a lawyer’s
criticism, see GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(a), r. 4.1(a), r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021). For a
discussion of the potential application of these rules to judicial criticism, see infra Part V.
35 See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[L]awyers’ statements unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be sanctioned
only if they pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.”); Garland v.
State, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133 (Ga. 1985) (finding that contemptuous statements are not
protected by the U.S. Constitution, nor by the Georgia Constitution, and that “[t]he test
applied to determine whether a statement is contemptuous is whether there is a clear and
present danger to orderly administration of justice”).
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whenever possible.36 Firm, reasoned commentary is proper and
constructive; caustic, vitriolic, or petty personal attacks are not. The
latter not only unjustly impugn the character of the judge criticized
but also reflect poorly on the lawyer who issues the criticism, thus
casting a negative light on both the judicial system and the
profession as a whole.37
Finally, lawyers can, should, and do publicly come to the defense
of judges believed to have been wrongfully criticized. In fact, the
ethical rules encourage such responses, especially in light of judges’
inability to speak out in their own defense.38 Lawyers who
forthrightly counter judicial criticism that they view as unjust or
inaccurate aptly provide citizens with a more balanced view of the
judicial conduct at issue, which then enables citizens to reach their
own conclusions.
Hence, constitutional parameters, sound rule-based restrictions,
and practical considerations rooted in a desire for professional
integrity and the quest for well-informed self-government combine
to ensure that proper, constructive judicial criticism will be the
norm rather than the exception.

II. BARROW V. RAFFENSPERGER
On February 26, 2020, Georgia Supreme Court Justice Keith
Blackwell submitted a letter to Governor Brian Kemp
communicating his resignation from the Court, effective November

36 See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 (1985) (observing that “[t]he necessity for civility
in the inherently contentious setting of the adversary process suggests that members of the
bar cast criticisms of the system in a professional and civil tone”).
37 See, e.g., In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Indiscriminate accusations
of dishonesty . . . do not help cleanse the judicial system of miscreants yet do impair its
functioning . . . . ”); Lieberman, supra note 29, at 796 (noting that lawyers’ “[i]rresponsible
attacks [on judges] have a very real likelihood of subverting the dignity and authority of the
courts”).
38 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 3 (2021) (“To maintain the fair and
independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts
to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.”); see also In re Tri-State Ethanol Co., No. 061043, 06-1040, 2007 WL 30337, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 3, 2007) (“Judges have virtually no
protection from politicians or lawyers. Unlike an opposing party, judges are not permitted to
respond, to testify, or file a brief or affidavit.”); Lieberman, supra note 29, at 796 (observing
that judges’ inability to defend themselves is likely the reason for inclusion of the “duty of
lawyers to speak out against improper personal attacks on judges”).
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18, 2020.39 Governor Kemp accepted the resignation the same day.40
Prior to this development, the expectation was that Justice
Blackwell would run for re-election in a nonpartisan general
election scheduled for May 19, 2020, as his six-year term was to
expire on December 31, 2020.41
On March 1, the governor notified Secretary of State Brad
Raffensperger of his intention to appoint Justice Blackwell’s
replacement, and the secretary accordingly canceled “candidate
qualifying for the May 19 election for Justice Blackwell’s office and
directed his staff . . . not to accept qualifying documents and fees for
the election.”42 Former Georgia Congressman John Barrow and
attorney Beth A. Beskin subsequently sought to qualify for the
election but were denied the right to do so in light of the secretary
of state’s cancelation.43 As a result, they each filed a petition in
Fulton County Superior Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering
Raffensperger to reopen the qualification process and to conduct the
election for Justice Blackwell’s seat.44
On March 16, the trial court denied the petitions, finding that
under the express language of the Georgia Constitution
and OCGA § 45-5-1, a vacancy existed for Justice
Blackwell’s seat as of February 26, 2020[,] and once
Governor Kemp notified the Secretary of State of [his]
decision to fill the seat via appointment, [the]
Secretary . . . no longer was under a statutory legal duty
to hold qualifications for Justice Blackwell’s seat.45
Barrow then sought expedited appellate review of this decision by
the Georgia Court of Appeals.46 On March 19, however, the court of
appeals transferred Barrow’s emergency motion to the Georgia
Supreme Court because the case involved an election contest, which

Barrow v. Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d 884, 888 (Ga. 2020).
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 888–89.
45 Id. at 889.
46 Id.
39
40
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is within that Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.47 Beskin filed a similar
emergency motion, and the two cases were consolidated for the
Georgia Supreme Court’s consideration.48
Barrow also filed a “Motion to Disqualify or Recuse” all eight
sitting supreme court justices49 contending that their impartiality
might reasonably be questioned in light of Justice Blackwell’s
involvement in the substance of the case, including as a witness.50
One of Barrow’s attorneys, Michael Moore, pointedly contended that
the maneuvering undertaken to ensure that Justice Blackwell’s
replacement was appointed rather than elected “already [gave] the
appearance that a group of insiders [had] determined that handselecting a justice and protecting a judicial pension [were] more
important than protecting the people of Georgia’s right to vote.”51
Id.
Id.
49 At the time of the motion, there were only eight justices, rather than nine, because
Justice Robert Benham’s vacant seat had not yet been filled by the governor. It was later
filled through the appointment of Court of Appeals Judge Carla Wong McMillian. Bill Rankin,
Barrow, Suing for High Court Vote, Tells 8 Justices: Recuse Yourselves, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/barrow-suing-for-high-court-vote-tellsjustices-recuse-selves/NZL4777nJu1tXMVEVAmoeI/; Bill Rankin, Kemp Appoints First
Asian-American Woman to Georgia Supreme Court, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/kemp-appoints-mcmillan-georgia-supremecourt/jzOqqOxk2cRqdfZqRDvyjP/. Once Justice McMillian took her seat on the Supreme
Court, she too recused herself. R. Robin McDonald, Another One: 6 Judges Have Stepped
Down from This Case by Candidates Suing to Run for Georgia’s High Court, DAILY REP. (Apr.
17,
2020,
5:35
PM)
[hereinafter
McDonald,
Another
One],
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/04/17/another-one-6-judges-have-steppeddown-from-this-case-by-candidates-suing-to-run-for-georgias-high-court/.
50 Although Justice Blackwell did not testify live in the trial court proceeding, his testimony
was presented by stipulation. See Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d at 888 n.2 (“We note that Justice
Blackwell is not a party in either of these cases, and while he was subpoenaed as a witness
in the trial court, his testimony (like that of all the witnesses) was presented by stipulation.
Thus, all of the evidentiary facts that the parties deemed pertinent are undisputed.”); R.
Robin McDonald & Greg Land, Fight for Justice Blackwell’s Seat Heads to Ga. Supreme
Court, Teeing Up Potential Conflict of Interest, DAILY REP. (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:19 PM)
[hereinafter
McDonald
&
Land,
Teeing
Up
Potential
Conflict],
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/03/19/fight-for-justice-blackwells-seat-heads-toga-supreme-court-teeing-up-potential-conflict-of-interest/ (explaining that Justice Blackwell
was “subpoenaed as a witness and submitted stipulated testimony in a Fulton County
Superior Court hearing on Barrow’s mandamus petition”).
51 McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50. The pension reference
apparently relates to the argument that if Justice Blackwell’s resignation was effective as of
47
48
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He further described allowing the sitting justices to decide the case
as akin to “asking the chickens in the henhouse to vote on whether
one of them can keep its golden egg.”52
Justice Blackwell readily recused himself from the case, as did
Justices Charles Bethel, Michael Boggs, John Ellington, and Nels
Peterson.53 Court of Appeals Judge Carla Wong McMillian was later
appointed to fill Justice Robert Benham’s vacant seat on the
supreme court, and she too promptly recused herself.54 However,
Chief Justice Harold Melton, Presiding Justice David Nahmias, and
February 26, 2020, when he announced his intention to retire, he would not have completed
the necessary ten years of appellate court service required to receive his full pension. See
O.C.G.A. § 47-2-244(f) (2021) (“After ten years of service as an appellate court judge, such
judge shall be entitled to receive during life a retirement benefit payable monthly equivalent
to 75 percent of the salary of an appellate court judge then serving in the office from which
such judge retired.”); see also R. Robin McDonald, Unwilling to Wait on State Supreme Court,
Voters Seek Injunction over Blackwell Seat, DAILY REP. (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:14 PM) [hereinafter
McDonald, Unwilling to Wait], https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/04/28/unwillingto-wait-on-state-supreme-court-voters-seek-injunction-over-blackwellseat/?slreturn=20210619153601 (quoting the plaintiffs’ attorney’s argument that “[i]f, as a
matter of law, Justice Blackwell’s resignation is effective in February 2020, then Justice
Blackwell has no right to receive the compensation and benefits he is receiving until
November 18, 2020”). Justice Blackwell was appointed to the court of appeals on November
1,
2010.
Keith
R.
Blackwell
2010–2012,
G A.
C T.
APPEALS,
https://www.gaappeals.us/history/judges.php?id=73.
The supreme court’s opinion in Raffensperger seems to counter Moore’s pension-related
criticism. Specifically, Justice Nahmias explained that Justice Blackwell’s resignation was
technically effective when accepted by the governor, at least for purposes of creating a
prospective right to appoint his successor. Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d at 887–88. However,
from the standpoint of creating a “vacancy” on the court, which actually triggers the
governor’s appointment power, that would not occur until November 18, 2020. Id. at 888.
Indeed, as noted by the court, Justice Blackwell “continue[d] to serve as a full-fledged Justice
of [the] Court” until that date. Id. at 887. But see McDonald, Unwilling to Wait, supra
(explaining that plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the state “cannot keep Justice Blackwell on
the bench and pay him, but treat him as retired for purposes of enabling Governor Kemp to
appoint his successor”).
52 McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50.
53 McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17. The Court dismissed Barrow’s
Motion to Disqualify or Recuse All Justices as moot with regard to these five justices, given
their voluntary decision to recuse. Order on Emergency Motions, Barrow v. Raffensperger,
No. S20M1012, S20M1020, 842 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. Mar. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Raffensperger,
March 23 Order], https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/barrowraffensperger.pdf.
54 See McDonald, Another One, supra note 49 (“The Supreme Court of Georgia’s newest
justice has decided to recuse rather than sit on a pending appeal over who will fill Justice
Keith Blackwell’s seat.”).
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Justice Sarah Warren opted to remain on the case.55 Specifically,
the supreme court issued an order stating that these three justices,
“having each carefully considered the motion to recuse him or her,
deny the motion.”56 In keeping with Georgia law, five superior court
judges were then appointed to replace the recused justices.57
The three remaining justices and the five superior court judges
partially granted emergency motions to hear the matter posthaste58 but later found that an immediate decision in the case, as
requested by Barrow and Beskin, was unnecessary; instead, they
held that “an opinion would be issued as soon as practicable.”59
On May 14, 2020, in a 6–2 opinion60 authored by Presiding
Justice Nahmias, the court held that although the trial court’s
reasoning was erroneous,61 it was correct in refusing to grant the
requested writ of mandamus because there was nothing to compel

McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
Raffensperger, March 23 Order, supra note 53.
57 Id. The superior court judges appointed to hear the case were “Scott Ballard of the Griffin
Judicial Circuit, Brenda Holbert Trammell of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit, the Southern
Circuit’s Richard Cowart, Oconee Circuit Chief Judge Sarah Wall, and Timothy Walmsley of
the Eastern Circuit in Savannah.” McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17. Rule
57 of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s Rules provides that “[a] disqualified or nonparticipating
Justice shall be replaced by a senior appellate justice or judge, a judge of the Court of Appeals,
or a judge of a superior court whenever necessary to achieve a quorum and on any other
occasion that the participating Justices by majority vote deem such replacement necessary.”
GA. SUP. CT. R. 57. The Court’s March 23, 2020 order described the replacement process as
follows: “Pursuant to this Court’s rules and policies, by unanimous vote of the participating
Justices, substitute judges have been selected by the Clerk of this Court at random from a
pre-existing list and have been designated to hear and decide these cases in the place of the
nonparticipating Justices.” Raffensperger, March 23 Order, supra note 53.
58 Raffensperger, March 23 Order, supra note 53.
59 Barrow v. Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d 884, 889 n.3 (Ga. 2020).
60 Judges Brenda Holbert Trammell and Scott L. Ballard dissented. Id. at 908–15
(Trammell, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Trammell noted that she is not opposed to
gubernatorial appointments. Id. at 915. “However, in this instance, when the resignation will
not result in a vacancy in the office until (originally) almost six months after the election, I
cannot in good conscience agree that the election should be cancelled and the will of the people
thrust aside as ‘fruitless and nugatory.’” Id.
Chief Justice Melton wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Warren and Judges
Cowart, Wall, and Walmsley, emphasizing that the case was “not about this Court’s choice
between election and appointments” but rather what the constitution and pertinent law
dictate. Id. at 907–08 (Melton, C.J., concurring).
61 See id. at 900–01 n.18 (plurality opinion) (finding that the trial court’s “conclusion was
poorly reasoned” and inconsistent with relevant precedent).
55
56
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the secretary of state to do.62 In particular, once the governor
accepted Justice Blackwell’s tendered resignation, a vacancy was
created, effective November 18, 2020.63 That vacancy extinguished
Justice Blackwell’s existing term and thereby “eliminate[d] the need
under the Constitution and statutes for an election for [his] next
term.”64

III. LAWYERS’ JUDICIAL CRITICISM IN BARROW V.
RAFFENSPERGER
Throughout the pendency of the Raffensperger litigation, the
lawyers for John Barrow and Beth Beskin were critical of various
members of the Georgia Supreme Court. Justice Blackwell, for one,
was criticized for what the lawyers perceived to be the motivation
behind the timing of his retirement.65 As already noted, Barrow’s
attorney Michael Moore suggested that the circumstances left the
impression that insiders had decided that it was more important to
hand-pick a replacement justice and protect a judicial pension than
to safeguard Georgia citizens’ right to vote.66 After the Court’s
decision in the case, Moore stated that Justice Blackwell’s seat had
been “sold for the price of a judicial pension and barely 40 days.”67
Furthermore, in criticizing Justice Nahmias, Barrow personally
62 See id. at 898–900 (“The Secretary of State generally may be compelled by mandamus to
conduct a legally required election, but not when the election will be legally nugatory.”
(emphasis omitted)). Although the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying
the writ of mandamus, it found that court’s reasoning to be erroneous. See id. at 887 (“[W]e
hold that while the trial court’s reasoning was mistaken, its conclusion that the Secretary of
State could not be compelled by mandamus to hold the May 19 election for Justice Blackwell’s
office was correct.”).
63 Id. at 887–88.
64 Id. at 898; see also id. (“[I]f an incumbent Justice’s office becomes vacant before his or
her existing term ends, that term and any future term associated with that Justice is
eliminated, so an election to fill such a term will, in legal effect, be nugatory.”).
65 McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21.
66 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. Along the same lines, Moore later stated,
“Whether it’s about protecting Justice Blackwell’s pension or packing the court with members
of the Federalist Society, it’s important that the voters and courts have access to those reasons
and discussions . . . .” Galloway, supra note 20.
67 R. Robin McDonald, GA Supreme Court Refuses to Compel Election for Justice Blackwell’s
Seat, DAILY REP. (May 14, 2020, 5:19 PM) [hereinafter McDonald, Court Refuses to Compel
Election], https://law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/05/14/ga-supreme-court-refuses-to-compelelection-for-justice-blackwells-seat/; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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stated that he was concerned that Justice Nahmias may be “‘trying
to manipulate the substitute justices’ appointed to replace his five
recused colleagues ‘for the same reason Justice Blackwell and the
governor have manipulated the timing of Justice Blackwell’s
“retirement”—to control the Georgia Supreme Court.’”68
The lawyers reserved their most forceful criticism for the three
non-recusing Justices—Melton, Nahmias, and Warren. One of
Barrow’s lawyers, Lester Tate, who previously served as chair of
Georgia’s Judicial Qualifications Commission, stated he was
“shocked that with a majority of the justices recusing that any
justice—particularly Presiding Justice Nahmias—would attempt to
continue to participate and give the public no facts or law
whatsoever to justify that decision.”69 Tate further maintained that
the justices’ refusal to recuse was “‘inconsistent with principles of
openness and impartiality’ and ‘violate[d] the rules that Justice
Nahmias, himself, ha[d] set down for other judges to abide by.’”70
Michael Moore’s criticism of the justices was even sharper,
suggesting that the justices were flouting their obligation to avoid
the appearance of impropriety.71 Specifically, he contended that “[i]f
their conduct is to become the accepted norm, Georgia judges will
no longer be expected to act without the appearance of impropriety,”
and “[i]nstead, it’ll be ok as long as they choose the ethical course of
conduct some of the time.”72 He also condemned what he viewed as
an obvious improper refusal to recuse by Justices Melton, Nahmias,
and Warren, contending that they had “individually gone to great
lengths to hang onto a case about their friend’s seat — one in which
the rules for every other judge in the state would have
unquestionably required recusal or disqualification.”73
The most severe criticism of the justices, however, came from
Barrow himself. He was particularly disconcerted over what he
believed to be an unnecessary delay by the court in the issuance of
McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21.
McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
70 Id.; see also McDonald, Court Refuses to Compel Election, supra note 67 (quoting Tate’s
declaration that “[i]f Justice Warren, Justice Nahmias, and Justice Melton had recused like
every other judge in the state would have been required to do if they had been sitting in
judgment of a colleague’s conduct, there easily could have and would have been a different
result”).
71 McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
72 Id.
73 Galloway, supra note 20.
68
69
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a ruling in the case.74 He speculated that the prolonged wait was an
intentional maneuver by the three non-recusing justices, led by
Justice Nahmias, and emphasized his view that Nahmias’s
remaining in the case was ethically improper—a perspective that
other lawyers shared, at least according to Barrow:
A lot of lawyers are concerned that our case is being
“slow walked” by the three justices who’ve refused to
step aside, especially Presiding Justice Nahmias.
Nahmias is notorious for his attempts to dominate the
Court. His refusal to step aside in this case is a violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He can’t be the judge of
a case involving a close colleague, and he can’t be the
judge of his own case. But that’s just what he’s doing.75
Barrow then converted his criticism into a campaign advertisement
of sorts, proclaiming that all citizens could rest assured that nothing
like this would happen if he were on the Georgia Supreme Court:
“No one should have to worry about something like that. When I’m
on the Supreme Court, nobody—no Democrat, Republican,
Independent, man, woman, or child—will have to fear that their
case is being manipulated or ‘slow walked’ for political ends.”76
Cary Ichter, counsel for Beskin, was more restrained in his
assessment of the court and resisted criticizing any justices
individually. Even so, he opined on the potential negative effect of a
decision upholding the secretary of state’s cancelation of the
election: “If the Supreme Court says Justice Blackwell’s seat is
vacant as Justice Blackwell continues to work with the other
justices each and every day, the credibility of the court will be a
distant memory.”77 He was somewhat more critical after the court
handed down its decision in the case, but even then, his comments
focused on the possible impact of the ruling without directly
criticizing any individual justice. In particular, Ichter stated that
“[i]t is frightening to think the court has issued a decision so
shortsighted with respect to its potential unintended consequences”

McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21.
Galloway et al., supra note 21.
76 Id.
77 McDonald, Unwilling to Wait, supra note 51.
74
75
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and further noted that the “entire scheme . . . is likely subject to
serious constitutional challenge.”78
Others who were not directly associated with the case also added
their voices to the discussion.79 Senior Fulton County Superior
Court Judge Melvin Westmoreland expressed concern that the
public might question the justices’ ability to decide the case
impartially,80 which in his view, counseled in favor of letting other
judges hear the appeal: “In an abundance of caution, it may be in
the Supreme Court’s best interest to consider a process which allows
judges from outside their bench to hear and decide this case.”81
Interestingly, one attorney, Richard Robbins, came to the defense
of the non-recusing justices and directly attacked Barrow and his
lawyers for their negative commentary. While Robbins
acknowledged that “[r]easonable attorneys can disagree with how
the case should have been decided,” he took issue with “experienced
attorneys [demonstrating] such a flagrant disrespect for the
Supreme Court and mak[ing] inflammatory and personal attacks on
the justices with whom they disagree.”82 He characterized the
criticism as “appalling” and detrimental to the administration of
justice:
These attacks only serve to harm the judiciary, which is
called upon to make important and controversial
decisions. One can disagree with rulings, but to attack
the judges personally damages our system of justice and
the respect we all should want citizens to have for the
judiciary. I understand the strong feelings about this

McDonald, Court Refuses to Compel Election, supra note 67 (alteration in original).
See, e.g., McDonald & Land, Teeing up Potential Conflict, supra note 50 (detailing
statements about the case from Fulton County Senior Judge Melvin Westmoreland and
former Georgia Supreme Court Justice Leah Sears, among others).
80 See id. (referencing Judge Westmoreland’s statement that “[w]hether the public
perceives the other justices as being able to impartially decide the matter so important to one
of their companions is difficult to gauge”).
81 Id.
82 Richard Robbins, Letter to the Editor, Lawyer Decries ‘Appalling’ Comments About High
REP.
(May
15,
2020,
2:40
PM),
Court
Justices,
DAILY
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/05/15/lawyer-decries-appalling-commentsabout-high-court-justices-letter/.
78
79
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particular case. But the public disrespect shown the
justices is inexcusable.83
Although Robbins acknowledged that the non-recusal decision of
the three justices was a “close call,” he respected their right to “act
as they felt was appropriate” and characterized them as “very wellregarded and very ethical.”84 He objected to their being castigated
for not recusing themselves and was especially animated over the
harsh criticism leveled at Justice Nahmias, calling Barrow’s
comments “untrue” and “offensive,” amounting to nothing more
than “petty name-calling.”85 Robbins concluded by generally
condemning the practice of lawyers criticizing judges in any manner
that could “diminish the authority and respect for the judiciary.”86
Seemingly, in his view, proper criticism would be solely limited to
apolitical expressions of disagreement with specific rulings.87
Notably, another attorney, Tom Stubbs, felt compelled to respond
to Robbins’s commentary by emphasizing the systemically
damaging effect of the court’s decision, which he viewed as
indisputably partisan in nature, and by defending the propriety of
the criticism advanced by Barrow and his lawyers.88 Specifically,
according to Stubbs, “[t]he most logical reading of [the court’s]
ruling is that the majority put personal partisan priorities and
favoritism for a colleague ahead of the law,” and “[t]hat kind of
ruling, to borrow a phrase, opens the door to the attendant
response.”89 He further asserted that “[t]urning logic and language
on its head as the majority must do to reach its conclusion makes it
difficult to view their ruling as anything other than one in which
their partisan slip shows.”90 Stubbs also questioned the propriety of

Id.
Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Tom Stubbs, Letter to the Editor, Election Decision ‘Will Tarnish’ State High Court’s
REP.
(May
18,
2020,
2:39
PM),
Reputation,
DAILY
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2020/05/18/election-decision-will-tarnish-state-highcourts-reputation-letter/ (“[T]he partisan shadow this ruling casts over our judiciary means
we cannot take their reasoning at face value.”).
89 Id.
90 Id.
83
84
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Justices Melton, Nahmias, and Warren remaining in the case and
compared the court’s decision to Bush v. Gore91:
[T]his ruling, led as it was by three justices who, by
every applicable standard, should have recused, will be
viewed as most observers view the U.S. Supreme
Court’s overtly partisan, outcome-driven ruling in Bush
v. Gore: it will tarnish the reputation of the court. . . .
The majority who birthed this ruling, sadly, earned
their day in infamy.92
Many will view the criticism of the court, individual justices, and
the lawyers themselves as severe, both in content and tone. But,
with regard to the three justices’ refusal to recuse, it is important to
emphasize that the lawyers had no legal recourse for challenging
the propriety of their non-recusal. Although at an earlier time Rule
26 of the Georgia Supreme Court Rules required an independent
review of recusal motions by the remaining justices when one justice
declined to recuse,93 that rule has since been abandoned. The
current version of Rule 26 permits a justice to consult with
colleagues on the bench about a recusal motion but ultimately
leaves that decision to the justice’s unilateral discretion.94
Conceivably, the lawyers in Raffensperger could have petitioned
for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court if a federal
question could properly be stated, but securing the grant of such a

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Stubbs, supra note 88.
93 See ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW SILVER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PROMOTING FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH RECUSAL REFORM 5 (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/promoting-fair-and-impartial-courts-through-recusal-reform (noting
that in 2010, Georgia Supreme Court Rule 26 provided that “if a justice subject to a
disqualification request declines to recuse, the remaining Justices decide the motion to
disqualify”).
94 GA. SUP. CT. R. 26; see also Order Amending Supreme Court Rule 26 (Ga. Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Order_Rule26_September2016_FINAL.pdf (“A Justice whose impartiality is questioned will determine, alone or in
consultation with the other Justices, whether to grant or deny the motion to disqualify or to
disqualify himself or herself from or not participate in the case voluntarily, rendering the
motion moot. The criteria for disqualification are set forth in statutory law, case law, and the
Code of Judicial Conduct.”).
91
92
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petition would have been a longshot at best.95 Alternatively, the
lawyers could have filed a disciplinary complaint against the nonrecusing justices with the Judicial Qualifications Commission.96
This, however, would not have been an attractive option because the
complaint was unlikely to succeed, and even if it was successful, the
resulting findings would not have changed the outcome in the
underlying litigation.97
Under these circumstances, what else could Barrow and his
lawyers have done besides publicly criticize the justices? Of course,
they could have chosen the path of least resistance and simply
remained silent and respectful, moving forward with the case on the
merits and then pursuing any viable post-judgment relief that
might have been obtainable. Had they proceeded in this fashion,
however, the recusal issue would have likely faded away without
the justices’ conduct receiving any sort of meaningful public
scrutiny or consideration. Whether or not the justices were correct
in their refusals to recuse, it is difficult to maintain that their
decisions should have escaped any consequential form of outside
examination. Furthermore, one could argue that had the lawyers
refrained from publicly voicing their concerns, they would have
breached their ethical duty to provide competent and diligent
representation, as well as their obligation to the public to safeguard
the administration of justice.98 On this view, it may have actually
95 See MATTHEW MENENDEZ & DOROTHY SAMUELS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., JUDICIAL
RECUSAL REFORM: TOWARD INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF DISQUALIFICATION 1 (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-recusal-reform-towardindependent-consideration-disqualification (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court “hears very
few cases” involving state supreme court justices’ decisions on recusal motions).
96 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(1) (2021) (requiring disqualification in any
proceeding in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or in which the
judge has a personal bias or prejudice); Functions & Procedures, supra note 13 (explaining
the procedure in Georgia for lawyers to file official disciplinary complaints).
97 See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 601 (“[R]eporting [a judge] is not a remedy likely to bring
effective reaction in many jurisdictions.”); Raffensperger, March 23 Order, supra note 53
(dismissing the motion to recuse in Raffensperger in part as moot). Moreover, any potential
efforts at obtaining outside review of the justices’ non-recusal would have been complicated
by the fact that they provided no explanation for their decision. McDonald, Court Splits in
Recusing, supra note 17.
98 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 (2021) (outlining a lawyer’s responsibility to “act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”); GA. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2021) (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
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been the lawyers’ professional responsibility to engage in judicial
criticism, just as they did. Even assuming there was a professional
obligation to speak out, though, the question remains whether these
lawyers did so in an appropriate manner, particularly in light of the
longstanding norms that have traditionally restrained when and
how lawyers can criticize judges.

IV. PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF JUDICIAL CRITICISM
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ABA’S APPROACH

Judicial criticism by lawyers has traditionally been subject to
some level of professional regulation by the bar. The ABA’s 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics—the first national, uniformlyadopted code of ethics in the United States99—emphasized the
necessity of lawyers exhibiting respect for the judiciary and
protecting judges against unjust criticism:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges,

the
the
the
not

opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).
99 See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2395, 2395 (2003) (stating that the 1908 Canons of Ethics were the “first national code
of legal ethics in this country”); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 50 (noting that “[a]
semblance of uniformity did exist for several decades because of the virtually unchallenged
universality of the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics”).
It should be noted that even before the adoption of any formal regulatory provision by the
ABA, and indeed, before the organization’s founding, the U.S. Supreme Court laid the
foundation for regulating judicial criticism by denouncing speech or conduct of lawyers that
reflects poorly on the administration of justice or regarding the qualifications and integrity
of a judge. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 356 (1871) (“A greater indignity could hardly
be offered to a judge than to threaten him with personal chastisement for his conduct on the
trial of a cause.”). In Bradley, an attorney sought damages against a judge who had barred
him from practicing before the court because of the attorney’s criticism of the judge during
trial. See id. at 344–45. In ultimately affirming the denial of the attorney’s claim, the Court
emphasized that attorneys are obligated to refrain from using insulting language or engaging
in offensive conduct directed towards “judges personally for their judicial acts.” Id. at 355.
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being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly
entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
criticism and clamor.100
This text suggests that, rather than criticizing judges, lawyers
should take care to defend jurists who are unjustly attacked. While
this declaration seemed to counsel against criticizing judges, the
Canons did recognize that, under certain circumstances, lawyers
had a professional obligation to criticize judges for serious lapses,
albeit through the formalized manner of submitting “grievances to
the proper authorities.”101 Along the same lines, in the context of
judicial selection, the Canons acknowledged the need for lawyers to
ensure that only suitable candidates for the bench were seated,
suggesting that appropriate, constructive criticism was not only
proper but encouraged in this context. As the Canons put it, lawyers
“should protest earnestly and actively against the appointment or
election of those who are unsuitable for the Bench.”102
It is important to note that the Canons were largely aspirational,
rather than legally-binding disciplinary standards.103 That changed
in 1969 with the ABA’s adoption of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which was subsequently adopted in some form by
every U.S. jurisdiction.104 The Code consisted of blackletter
Disciplinary Rules (DRs) and aspirational Ethical Considerations
(ECs) designed to highlight and reinforce aspects of the DRs and

CANONS OF PRO. ETHICS Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
Id. (“Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the
right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases,
but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be
protected.” (emphasis added)).
102 CANONS OF PRO. ETHICS Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
103 See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 55 (“The Canons were probably not intended to have any
direct legal effect, but it is clear that the ABA leadership contemplated that they would be
influential in lawyer discipline proceedings in courts.” (footnote omitted)).
104 See id. at 56–57 (noting that every state, except California adopted some version of the
Model Code, and it had a “strong influence” even in California). At present, all states have
adopted rules of professional conduct based, in varying degrees, on the ABA Model Rules. See
Maldonado, supra note 25 (describing California’s adoption of new ethics rules that “closely
follow the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct”).
100
101
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also to inspire lawyers to go above what the rules required in the
interest of professionalism.105
With regard to judicial criticism, the Model Code declared that
“[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a
judge or other adjudicatory officer.”106 Thus, any statement by a
lawyer about a judge, known to be false, would have subjected a
lawyer to discipline. The accompanying Ethical Consideration, EC
8-6, acknowledged a lawyer’s right to criticize judges publicly,
principally in the context of judicial selection, given the uniquely
informed perspective of members of the bar.107 However, EC 8-6 also
emphasized that the substance of any such criticism had to be
meritorious and its delivery appropriately restrained and decorous:
Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal
observation or investigation, to evaluate the
qualifications of persons seeking or being considered for
such public offices, and for this reason they have a
special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those
who are qualified. . . . Lawyers should protest earnestly
against the appointment or election of those who are
unsuited for the bench and should strive to have elected
or appointed thereto only those who are willing to forego
pursuits, whether of a business, political, or other
nature, that may interfere with the free and fair
consideration
of
questions
presented
for
adjudication. . . . While a lawyer as a citizen has a right
to criticize such officials publicly, he should be certain of
the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language,
and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence
in our legal system.108

As noted in the Preliminary Statement to the Model Code, the ECs were “aspirational
in character and represent[ed] the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive.” MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. Preliminary Statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
106 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 8-102(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
107 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
108 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
105
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In addition, as in the Canons of Professional Ethics, EC 8-6
highlighted the importance of lawyers defending judges “against
unjust criticism” because of restrictions on judges being able to do
so themselves.109 Moreover, and most significantly, EC 8-6
suggested that judicial criticism was only appropriate when
motivated by a desire to improve the legal system: “Criticisms
motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal
system are not justified.”110
Thus, while the blackletter DR, on its face, seems to have simply
prohibited knowingly false statements about judges, in reality, the
expectation under the Model Code was much more circumscribed in
terms of the type of judicial criticism deemed acceptable, even if
true.
Besides being truthful, a lawyer’s judicial critique ideally would
not include such things as “intemperate statements,” “petty
criticisms,” or statements of any kind not issued for the purpose of
improving the legal system.111 As a result, even if a lawyer
determined that the most effective way to advocate on behalf of a
client was to publicly expose a judge’s perceived bias or prejudice,
the Model Code would have at least discouraged, and perhaps
wholly foreclosed, such a strategy. This state of affairs created
particular difficulties for the lawyer who concluded that only strong
language would suffice to convey the severity of a jurist’s improper
conduct.112 EC 8-6, after all, counseled lawyers to use “appropriate
language” when critiquing judges, limited to temperate,
constructive utterances.113 The idea, so it seemed, was to outlaw
109 Id. (“Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly freed to defend themselves, are entitled to
receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism.”); see also supra note 100 and
accompanying text. But see In re Mahoney, 280 Cal. Rptr. 3d 2, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)
(“The judge of a court is well within his rights in protecting his own reputation from
groundless attacks upon his judicial integrity and it is his bounden duty to protect the
integrity of his court.” (quoting In re Ciraolo, 450 P.2d 241, 244 (Cal. 1969))).
110 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
111 Id.
112 Cf. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in
the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 542 (2009)
(“Conduct that might fairly be characterized as discourteous in the abstract can be reasonable
in the context of proceedings in which a judge is provoked or is otherwise seeking to maintain
order.”). But see Lieberman, supra note 29, at 796 (arguing that “lawyers should be limited
to criticism that is offered in a courteous and professional manner for the purpose of
improving the administration of justice”).
113 MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-6 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1980).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/4

28

Brown: Criticizing Judges

2021]

CRITICIZING JUDGES

189

speech by lawyers that might undermine “public confidence in our
legal system,”114 apparently even when that confidence may have
been undeserved as a matter of fact.
In 1983, primarily because of concerns about overall format and
content, the ABA replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.115 Unlike the Model Code, with its numerous
ECs that arguably modified or enlarged the reach of the DRs, the
Model Rules utilized a Restatement-style format with blackletter
text followed by explanatory comments.116 Rule 8.2(a), dealing with
judicial criticism, was included in the original set of rules.117 It was
seemingly adopted without any controversy, and the rule’s language
is the same now as it was in 1983118:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
Id.; see supra note 108 and accompanying text. Rule 8.2(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct also adheres to this central purpose of ensuring public confidence in the
system. See, e.g., In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (“The
prohibitions in [Rule] 8.2(a) are concerned with preserving the public’s confidence in the
administration of justice.”); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1437
(9th Cir. 1995) (“Ethical rules that prohibit false statements impugning the integrity of
judges . . . are not designed to shield judges from unpleasant or offensive criticism, but to
preserve public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of our system of justice.”); In re
Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (noting that “the state has a substantial
interest in maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice” in its discussion
regarding Rule 8.2(a)).
115 See AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2013 xiv–xvi (Art Garwin ed.,
2013) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (illustrating that the inconvenient “tripartite
format of the Model Code,” which invited confusion regarding application and enforceability
of the rules, was a primary impetus behind the need for a new format of professional ethical
rules); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 60–61 (discussing various criticisms of and
concerns regarding the Model Code, including potential antitrust challenges).
116 See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at xiv (noting an observation made during
the debate by the ABA House Delegates concerning the reformatting of the rules that “the
unique tripartite format of the Model Code had led to confusion about the interrelationship
among the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, and inconsistent
application by courts and disciplinary agencies”).
117 See id. at 835 (stating that Rule 8.2 and its comments “were adopted at the August 1983
ABA Annual Meeting”).
118 See id. at 835–37 (chronicling Rule 8.2(a) from its unchallenged adoption to its modernday iteration).
114
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officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to
judicial or legal office.119
The text of Rule 8.2(a) mirrors the standard for defamation
claims made by public figures, which the U.S. Supreme Court
established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.120 Indeed, the 1981
proposed draft of the rule cited Sullivan, noting that “[t]he Supreme
Court has held that false statements about public officials may be
punished only if the speaker acts with knowledge that the
statement is ‘false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false
or not’ and that ‘Rule 8.2 is consistent with that limitation.’”121
Textually, Rule 8.2(a) both broadened and narrowed the scope of
prohibited judicial criticism. The language of the rule seems broader
than previous regulatory iterations insofar as it is not solely limited
to statements known to be false; instead, it also disallows
commentary about judges made with reckless disregard as to truth
or falsity.122 A reasonable interpretation of the rule’s standard for a
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that a public official
may only recover for defamation upon a showing that the allegedly offending statement was
made with “actual malice,” meaning “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65–67 (1964)
(utilizing the same standard in reversing the conviction of a prosecutor for criminal
defamation stemming from his media comments criticizing local judges for a backlog of cases,
which he attributed to their “inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations,” among other
things); see also In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (noting that “the
rule’s language itself is consistent with the constitutional limitations placed on defamation
actions by the United States Supreme Court cases of [Sullivan] and Garrison”); Tarkington,
supra note 29, at 1569 (observing that the ABA “expressly adopted the Sullivan standard in
Model Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.2”).
121 Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1587 (alteration in original) (quoting ABA COMM’N ON
EVALUATION OF PRO. STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT: MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 206 (1981)); see also AM. BAR. ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 344–345 (1984) (explaining that Rule 8.2(a) is consistent with the standard
established in Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana, which dealt with the constitutionality of
a criminal defamation statute); AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 688 (Ellen J. Bennett & Helen W. Gunnarsson eds., 9th
ed. 2019) (observing that “Rule 8.2(a) adopts the same standard for professional responsibility
purposes” as Sullivan and Garrison); David L. Hudson Jr., How Far Can Criticism of Judges
J.
(Dec.
1,
2016,
2:30
AM),
Go
Under
Ethics
Rules?,
A.B.A.
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/criticism_judges_ethics_rules (noting that
Rule 8.2(a) “echoes the standard in libel law articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan”).
122 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
119
120
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violation would be that, unless recklessly made, a lawyer must
subjectively know that the criticism is false.123 Such a construction
is consistent with the Sullivan defamation standard124 and is
arguably what the ABA intended.125 Thus, the scope of the rule,
outside of the “recklessness” context, seems quite narrow, capturing
only intentionally false criticism. Nevertheless, most courts
applying states’ versions of Rule 8.2(a) have opted for a standard of
“objective reasonableness,”126 thereby significantly broadening the
rule’s reach and affording less First Amendment protection to
lawyers’ speech concerning judges.127 For example, in In re Westfall,
the Missouri Supreme Court held that despite the wording of Rule
8.2(a) being identical to the subjective standard announced in
Sullivan, in the disciplinary context, an objective standard had to
be applied. In the court’s view, the state’s “interest in protecting the

123 Cf. Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1588 (emphasizing that the Sullivan standard is
determined by “the speaker’s subjective intent”).
124 See supra note 120.
125 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1587 (observing that “[o]ne of the most jarring
aspects of the cases on attorney speech impugning judicial integrity is the near universal
rejection by state courts of the Sullivan [subjective] standard,” replacing it with an “objective
reasonableness standard”); see also Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 85 A.3d 264, 277 (Md.
2014) (applying the objective standard because “[e]ven outside the courtroom, the speech of a
lawyer may be curtailed to an extent greater than an ordinary citizen’s” (alteration in
original) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 560 (Md. 2003))); Bd. of
Pro. Resp. v. Davidson, 205 P.3d 1008, 1016 (Wyo. 2009) (holding that “[b]ecause of the
interest in protecting the public, the administration of justice and the profession, a purely
subjective standard is inappropriate”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750
N.W.2d 71, 80 (Iowa 2008) (finding that “a majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue has
concluded the interests protected by the disciplinary system call for a test less stringent than
the New York Times standard”).
127 However, it is important to note that, even with this broadened objective reasonableness
standard, the current version of Model Rule 8.2(a) remains narrower than its predecessor
regulations, as it focuses only on criticism that relates to a judge’s “qualifications or integrity.”
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). While this limitation could
be interpreted liberally to cover a wide swath of speech, it nevertheless suggests that there
are certain areas that are beyond the rule’s reach. For example, criticizing judges for their
courtroom style or manner of speaking would not necessarily call into question a judge’s
qualifications or integrity and should be permissible—though perhaps unwise, as a practical
matter—under Rule 8.2(a).
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public, the administration of justice, and the profession, [made use
of] a purely subjective standard . . . inappropriate.”128
State courts typically justify the more restrictive curtailment of
attorney speech critical of the judiciary by relying on lofty ideals
related to the sacred nature of the legal profession.129 In other
words, by accepting membership in the bar, one necessarily must
sacrifice certain rights, including the right to criticize judges in a
manner that would impugn a judge’s integrity or call the judge’s
qualifications into question.130 Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court
in Westfall stated as much explicitly: “Other courts reject first
amendment arguments in holding that an attorney’s voluntary
entrance to the bar acts as a voluntary waiver of the right to criticize
the judiciary.”131
Clearly, there is a dramatic difference between Sullivan’s
subjective standard and the objective standard widely applied in
128 In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (relying on In re Graham, 453
N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990); see also Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430,
1437 (9th Cir. 1995) (opting for an objective standard in assessing propriety of judicial
criticism by lawyers, i.e., “what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his
professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances” (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the E. Dist. Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993))).
129 See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“A lawyer
belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor, which experience has
shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of justice. He who would follow
that calling must conform to those standards. Obedience to ethical precepts may require
abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.”).
130 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1081–82 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Lawyers are officers of the court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to
ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally
protected speech.”); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644–45 (1985) (“The license granted by the
court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the
role of courts in the administration of justice.”); In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir.
1995) (observing that U.S. Supreme Court cases like Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995), and Gentile demonstrate that courts “may require attorneys to speak with greater
care and civility than is the norm in political campaigns”); Tarkington, supra note 29, at
1622–29 (explaining the constitutional limitations on speech within the privilege of practicing
law); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 873 (arguing that to apply less than strict
scrutiny in analyzing restrictions on speech by lawyers because of their status as lawyers is
“an unconstitutional condition on bar membership”).
131 In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 834; see also In re Madison, 282 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Mo. 2009)
(noting that a lawyer’s constitutional rights may be restricted by the state to protect the
integrity of the judiciary); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990) (stating that
attorneys who make reckless critical statements regarding judges or other legal officers
exhibit a flaw in judgment that conflicts with their role of officer of the court).
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assessing whether a lawyer has violated Rule 8.2(a). As Professor
Margaret Tarkington has suggested, some courts seem to be of the
view “that a reasonable attorney would never impugn the dignity of
a court without significant evidence of misconduct.”132 Such an
approach undoubtedly has the effect of diminishing a lawyer’s
willingness to criticize a judge, even when there might be a valid
subjective basis for doing so.
Furthermore, consistent with the former Model Code approach,
Comment 1 to Rule 8.2 indicates that the central purpose of the
provision is to protect the sanctity of our legal system. As it states,
“false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public
confidence in the administration of justice.”133 Yet, as in the Model
Code and the Canons, the Comment stresses the importance of
constructive, truthful statements by lawyers about judges in the
selection process: “Assessments by lawyers are relied on in
evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being
considered for election or appointment to judicial office . . . .
Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes
to improving the administration of justice.”134 Moreover, there is the
continued emphasis on the necessity of lawyers coming to the
defense of judges who are wrongfully criticized, given restrictions
on judges’ ability to do so personally: “To maintain the fair and
independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to
continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly
criticized.”135
Conspicuously, every U.S. jurisdiction, with the exceptions of
Georgia and the District of Columbia, has adopted Rule 8.2(a) and
its comments.136 Therefore, in virtually every corner of the country,
a lawyer’s freedom to criticize judges is more constrained than that
of nonlawyers. For example, then-presidential candidate Donald
Trump—a nonlawyer—could publicly question the impartiality of
federal district court Judge Gonzalo Curiel, based solely on the

Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1590.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
134 Id.
135 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also WOLFRAM,
supra note 2, at 601 (observing that lawyer codes express the common wish that “lawyers
might come to the defense of judges unfairly accused”).
136 AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 22.
132
133
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judge’s Mexican heritage,137 but a lawyer offering a similar critique
would almost certainly have been viewed as violating Rule 8.2(a).
To be sure, serious concerns were raised by the eventual President’s
comments in terms of their potential effect on the public’s
perception of the justice system, among other things, and many
deemed them to be highly inappropriate coming from the nation’s
chief executive.138 Yet, Trump had the freedom to criticize Judge
Curiel in this manner, no matter how ill-advised or unsavory,
because only “false” or “reckless” statements of “fact”—as those
terms have been interpreted by the courts—could have supported a
successful slander or libel action under the Sullivan standard.139
Lawyers, on the other hand, must be much more cautious and
circumscribed when criticizing judges, at least everywhere except
(perhaps) in Georgia and the District of Columbia.140
137 See Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict’,
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-upattacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442 (describing Trump’s contentions that federal
district court Judge Gonzalo Curiel could not be impartial in a lawsuit related to Trump
University because the judge was of Mexican heritage).
138 See, e.g., Jose A. Del Real & Katie Zezima, Trump’s Personal, Racially Tinged Attacks
on Federal Judge Alarm Legal Experts, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/06/01/437ccae6-280b-11e6-a3c40724e8e24f3f_story.html (“Trump’s strikingly personal attacks on Curiel are highly unusual
and have prompted questions about how he would react to adverse judicial decisions should
he become president.”); Siobhan Hughes, Paul Ryan: Donald Trump’s Judge Comments ‘Out
of Left Field’, WALL ST. J.: WASHWIRE BLOG (June 3, 2016, 2:29 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-WB-63595 (describing Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell’s
criticisms of Trump’s comments); Jose A. Del Real & Mike DeBonis, Trump Increasingly
Alone in Defending His Racial Attacks on Latino Federal Judge, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-increasingly-alone-in-defending-his-racialattacks-on-latino-federal-judge/2016/06/06/be2cee3e-2c15-11e6-9b3742985f6a265c_story.html (“One of the strongest criticisms came from Sen. Susan Collins of
Maine, who has said that she plans to support the presumptive GOP nominee. ‘His statement
that Judge Curiel could not rule fairly because of his Mexican heritage does not represent our
American values,’ Collins said in a statement. ‘Mr. Trump’s comments demonstrate both a
lack of respect for the judicial system and the principle of separation of powers.’”); Dan
Carden, Pence Deems Trump Criticism of E.C.-Born Judge ‘Inappropriate’, NWI TIMES (Feb.
28,
2018),
https://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/pence-deems-trumpcriticism-of-e-c--born-judge-inappropriate/article_f1cc25bb-7f71-5f03-9ebb97c66f3e4f3b.html (“‘Of course I think those comments were inappropriate,’ Pence told
reporters Tuesday. ‘I don’t think it’s ever appropriate to question the partiality of a judge
based on their ethnic background.’”).
139 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
140 See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 22.
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B. GEORGIA’S APPROACH TO JUDICIAL CRITICISM BY LAWYERS

Until 2001, lawyers’ criticism of judges in Georgia was governed
by DR 8-102 and EC 8-6 because the state had adopted the Model
Code provisions verbatim.141 In 2001, Georgia switched to the Model
Rules with various notable deviations, seemingly intent on
retaining certain vestiges of the earlier version of its rules or else
opting to go in its own independent direction.142 One significant area
in which Georgia chose an idiosyncratic path was the regulation of
judicial criticism. Rather than adhering to the traditional Model
Code approach that it had followed for years or adopting Model Rule
8.2(a), like almost every other jurisdiction, Georgia simply declined
to adopt any blackletter rule on this point. Specifically, it enacted
Rule 8.2(b), which requires that lawyers seeking judicial office
adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct, but expressly “reserved”
adoption of Rule 8.2(a).143 Yet Georgia, somewhat inexplicably,
adopted all of the comments to Model Rule 8.2, including those that
clearly relate only to Rule 8.2(a).144 Hence, while there is no
blackletter prohibition, the comments imply otherwise, stressing
the importance of lawyers commenting on the qualifications of those
being considered for judicial office and indicating that false
statements about judges undermine public confidence in the legal
system.145
141 See GA. RULES OF PRO. RESP. DR 8-102, EC 8-6 (2000) (prohibiting knowing “false
statements of fact concerning the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to
judicial office” and “false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer” and
circumscribing the ability of lawyers to criticize judges and protest judicial elections or
appointments).
142 Compare GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021) (“It shall be a violation of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .” (emphasis added)), with MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation . . . .”).
143 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 (2021).
144 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmts. 1–3 (2021) (retaining the same language
as the comments to the ABA’s Model Rule 8.2).
145 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 1 (2021) (“Assessments by lawyers are relied
on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election
or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general,
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Why Georgia chose this approach is not clear. There is no
documented legislative history, only anecdotal evidence and
speculation. The anecdotal evidence suggests that Georgia’s
Disciplinary Rules and Procedures Committee may have been
concerned that Rule 8.2(a) could run afoul of the First
Amendment.146 In particular, there seems to have been a concern
“that an errant judge might misuse the rule” to unduly curtail a
lawyer’s speech.147 In addition, some viewed the rule as unfairly
singling out one group of lawyers—judges—for protection but not
affording similar safeguards for other members of the bar.148
The “errant judge” concern149 seems dubious because one could
argue that there is always a risk that a judge may abuse or misapply
a rule of professional conduct. For example, a judge might errantly
restrict a lawyer’s First Amendment rights under Rule 3.6, which
limits counsel’s ability to comment publicly about litigation.150

prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such
matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements
by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.”).
146 See E-mail from Bill NeSmith, Deputy Gen. Couns. of the State Bar of Georgia, to Lonnie
Brown Jr., Professor of L., Univ. of Georgia (July 1, 2020, 14:33 EST) (on file with the author)
(citing “First Amendment concerns” recalled by members of the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures Committee).
147 Id.
148 See id. (relaying the recollection of two committee members about a concern “that the
rule singles out a particular group for protection not extended to all lawyers”). It is important
to note that Deputy General Counsel NeSmith emphasized that these were recollections from
20 years ago. Id.
149 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
150 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (2021) (“A lawyer who is participating or has
participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public
communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”); GA. RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(b) (2021) (“Reserved.”); GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(c) (2021)
(“Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer
would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant
to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent
adverse publicity.”); GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(d) (2021) (“No lawyer associated in a
firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement
prohibited by paragraph (a).”).
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Nevertheless, Georgia has adopted that provision, principally styled
after the corresponding Model Rule.151
The adoption of Rule 3.6, however, may add some legitimacy to
the second proffered rationale for not adopting Rule 8.2(a)—
avoiding unequal First Amendment treatment of lawyers and
judges.152 In particular, Rule 2.10 of Georgia’s Code of Judicial
Conduct constrains a judge’s ability to comment publicly on pending
or impending litigation in a fashion similar to Rule 3.6’s limitation
on lawyers.153 With regard to Rule 8.2(a), there is no directly
parallel counterpart in the Georgia Judicial Code.154 Thus, if
Georgia had adopted Rule 8.2(a), there would be a standard
restricting a lawyer’s right to criticize judges without any
corresponding restriction on a judge’s ability to criticize lawyers.
While superficially logical, equating ethical standards applicable
to lawyers with those applicable to judges seems to be an apples-tooranges comparison. Judges and lawyers, though both admitted to
the practice of law, have very different roles within the system, and
Compare GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 (2021), with MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
152 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.10(A) (2021) (“Judges shall not make, on any
pending proceeding or impending matter in any court, any public comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any non-public
comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.”); GA. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT r. 2.10(B) (2021) (“Judges shall not, in connection with cases, controversies, or
issues that are likely to come before the court, make promises or commitments that are
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”); GA.
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.10(C) (2021) (“Judges shall require court staff, court officials, and
others subject to the judge’s direction and control to refrain from making statements that the
judge would be prohibited from making by Rule 2.10.”); GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.10(D)
(2021) (“Notwithstanding the restrictions in Rule 2.10, a judge may make public statements
in the course of official duties, may explain court procedures, and may comment on any
proceeding in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.”). For the text of Rule 3.6
regarding attorneys, see supra note 150.
154 Notably, Georgia has not adopted Rule 4.1(A)(11) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
which precludes a “judge or a judicial candidate” from “knowingly, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, mak[ing] any false or misleading statement.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r.
4.1(A)(11) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added). The closest provision in Georgia’s Code of
Judicial Conduct is Rule 4.2(A)(3), which prohibits “judicial candidates” from “us[ing] or
participat[ing] in the publication of a false statement of fact, or mak[ing] any misleading
statement concerning themselves or their candidacies, or concerning any opposing judicial
candidate or candidacy, with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard
for the statement’s truth or falsity.” GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021) (emphases
added).
151
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those differences rightly inform the content of the regulations that
govern each group’s conduct. Consequently, although there are a
few parallel obligations,155 the vast majority of the ethics rules are
specifically tailored to the differing functions of judges and lawyers
within the justice system. For example, a judge may be disqualified
from a case whenever his or her impartiality may reasonably be
questioned,156 while the standard for lawyer disqualification for a
conflict of interest requires a significant risk that the conflict will
materially and adversely affect a representation.157
Thus, in light of the less-than-persuasive anecdotal explanations
for Georgia’s omission of Rule 8.2(a), one is left to engage in rational
speculation that may coincide with those proffered reasons. The
most plausible theory seems to be that Georgia simply wanted to
protect lawyers’ ability to criticize judges more broadly than Rule
8.2(a) would allow, while still putting some restraints on the range
of permissible criticism. This theory would explain the omission of
the blackletter text of Rule 8.2(a) but the inclusion of the related
comments.158 Specifically, Comment 1 encourages lawyers to
candidly express opinions about judges, recognizing that this can
“contribute[] to improving the administration of justice.”159 On the
other hand, the comment discourages false statements, noting that
they “can unfairly undermine public confidence in the
administration of justice.”160 Furthermore, Comment 3 embraces
the traditional concept that lawyers should speak out to “defend

155 Compare, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.15(B) (2021) (outlining a judge’s duty to
report to the appropriate authority known violations of the rules of professional conduct by
lawyers that raise “a substantial question as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects”), with GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (2021)
(providing that lawyers should report to the appropriate professional authority known
violations of the rules of professional conduct that raise “a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”).
156 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (2021) (providing that “[j]udges shall
disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned”).
157 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (2021). In the context of a current representation
adverse to a former client, the current and former matters must be the same or substantially
related to create a disqualifying conflict for a lawyer. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(A)
(2021).
158 See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
159 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 1 (2021).
160 Id.
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judges and courts unjustly criticized.”161 The chosen formulation
points to an underlying intent to enable lawyers to speak freely in
critiquing judges—but lawyers must do so in a responsible manner
and for a proper purpose—and simultaneously be willing to come to
the defense of judges when they are wrongfully criticized.
While there appear to be no Georgia disciplinary cases involving
lawyers’ criticism of judges,162 there are judicial opinions that seem
consistent with the notion that robust First Amendment protection
for lawyers may be the impetus underlying the state’s rejection of
Rule 8.2(a). For example, in Garland v. State, an attorney
representing a defendant charged with drug trafficking was
essentially accused by the trial judge during a pretrial hearing of
involvement in the defendant’s escape from the jail where he was
being held.163 The attorney, who was not given an opportunity to
respond to the judge’s accusation, subsequently vented his anger
and frustration to a newspaper reporter.164 In the attorney’s
published remarks, he described the pretrial hearing as “a sham
proceeding” that was “unlawful and improper,” as well as “‘a
political effort to turn a tragedy into political hay for’ the trial
judge,” and concluded that “the trial court’s actions had ‘violated the
canons of judicial ethics [and] constitute[d] slander of the rankest
order.’”165 After the attorney’s remarks were published, a different
judge held the attorney in criminal contempt based on the content
of those statements.166 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the contempt order, finding that the attorney’s comments
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 3 (2021).
See
Recent
Attorney
Discipline,
STATE
BAR
GA.,
https://www.gabar.org/forthepublic/recent-discipline.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (listing
instances of attorney discipline, with no cases involving judicial criticism). It should be noted,
however, that one Georgia lawyer has had a disciplinary complaint filed against him, in part,
for inflammatory remarks that he made about Chief Justice of the United States John
Roberts. See David Cohen, Georgia State Bar Seeking to Discipline Lin Wood, POLITICO (Feb.
14, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/14/lin-wood-georgia-469015
(describing the State Bar of Georgia’s effort to discipline Lin Wood for various comments,
including his allegation “that Chief Justice John Roberts [was] involved in a sex-trafficking
ring and that he plotted to kill Justice Antonin Scalia”).
163 325 S.E.2d 131, 132–33 (Ga. 1985).
164 Id. at 133.
165 Id.
166 Id. The original trial judge who was the subject of the attorney’s statements recused
himself from the case following the pretrial hearing, which is why a different judge issued the
contempt order. Id.
161
162
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were beyond the protection of the First Amendment because they
represented a “contumacious interference with or an obstruction of
the administration of justice.”167
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the attorney’s
statements did not “present a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice” and therefore were protected by the First
Amendment.168 Significantly, the court borrowed liberally from
Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in Bridges v. California169 to highlight
the importance of the First Amendment in the context of judicial
criticism:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be
won by shielding judges from published criticism
wrongly appraises the character of American public
opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions. And an enforced silence,
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the
dignity of the bench, would probably engender
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it
would enhance respect.170
The court went on to indicate, however, that it did not condone the
type of statements made by the attorney and emphasized that
“[c]ivility and courtesy should be hallmarks of the legal
profession.”171 Nevertheless, in the context of assessing the

Id. (quoting Garland v. State, 320 S.E.2d 548, 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d 325 S.E.2d
131 (Ga. 1985)). It should be noted that when a lawyer’s public statements relate to pending
litigation in which the lawyer is involved, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada held that they may be regulated under a standard less demanding than “clear and
present danger.” 501 U.S. 1030, 1036, 1075 (1991); id. at 1063 (holding “the ‘substantial
likelihood of material prejudice’ standard . . . satisfies the First Amendment”). The applicable
standard is now embodied in Georgia Rule 3.6(a). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 150.
168 Garland, 325 S.E.2d at 134.
169 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
170 Garland, 325 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270–71); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that “debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”).
171 Garland, 325 S.E.2d at 134.
167

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/4

40

Brown: Criticizing Judges

2021]

CRITICIZING JUDGES

201

propriety of the imposition of criminal contempt, those aspirational
elements of professionalism were not deemed pertinent.172
More recently, in Baskin v. Hale,173 the Georgia Court of Appeals
echoed the supreme court’s deference to the First Amendment in the
area of judicial criticism.174 In this custody case, the trial court
issued a permanent injunction that prohibited the parties and their
counsel from commenting on the matter or making any disparaging
or derogatory remarks about the opposing party to the media or on
social media.175 The injunction would have lasted for ten years and
apparently included within its proscription criticism of the court.176
In holding that the injunction violated the First Amendment, the
court of appeals acknowledged the authority of “trial courts to
restrict a parent’s communications and postings on social media
during the pendency of a divorce or custody proceeding.”177
However, it could not “condone the superior court’s attempt in this
case to restrict the parties’ and lawyers’ right to publicly criticize
the court and the litigation for the next ten years.”178 The court of
appeals found lacking any evidence of the necessary “imminent
danger” or “compelling interest” that might warrant the imposition
of such a prior restraint on speech.179
Both Garland and Baskin support the view that lawyers in
Georgia have ample constitutional room to criticize judges, even
172 See id. (“Viewing this case in the context of the restraints by which we are bound, we
cannot find the statements present a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.”). The supreme court appeared to intimate that the attorney’s comments might have
constituted slander and could be the subject of a disciplinary proceeding but did not reach
any conclusions in this regard. See id. (“We are not dealing with the broader areas of civil
actions for libel or slander or disciplinary proceedings against an attorney.”).
173 787 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
174 Id. at 792 (“[T]he law gives judges as persons, or courts as institutions no greater
immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.” (quoting Landmark Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978))).
175 See id. at 788 (“[Baskin, Hale], their attorneys, and the [GAL] are hereby restrained and
enjoined from putting, placing[,] or causing to be placed any information concerning this
custody case upon or in any social media, website, or other public medium. The parties are
restrained and enjoined from, directly or indirectly, putting, placing, or causing to be placed
any disparaging or derogatory comments about the opposite party upon or in any social
media, website, or other public medium.” (alterations in original)).
176 Id. at 791–92.
177 Id. at 792.
178 Id.
179 Id. (quoting Cruz v. Jackson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. (In re Interest of R.J.M.B.), 133
So. 3d 335, 346 (Miss. 2013)).
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when that criticism may be caustic and in bad taste. Nonetheless,
Georgia still could have opted to afford lawyers less protection from
the standpoint of professional discipline, following the lead of most
states, by adopting Rule 8.2(a).180 The fact that it did not, choosing
instead to cherry-pick from the Model Rules’ comments,181 strongly
implies that Georgia intended to permit judicial criticism to the full
extent allowed by the Constitution for nonlawyers.
Although there is no way to know for sure what may have been
in the collective minds of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures
Committee, the Board of Governors of the State Bar, and the
justices of the Georgia Supreme Court (the ultimate approver of
rules of professional conduct),182 the decision to reject Rule 8.2(a)
makes eminent sense from the standpoint of the First Amendment
and the public’s interest. Specifically, given their education and
training, lawyers are best equipped to accurately assess the overall
performance of judges, especially as to whether they are adhering
to required ethical standards.183 It is important for lawyers to
responsibly share their views and opinions about judges, thus
enabling members of the public to be informed voters and
participants in the judicial process.184 Rule 8.2(a) and the objective
manner in which it is typically applied almost certainly deter some
lawyers from speaking out, even when what they have to say is

180 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the jurisdictional breakdown of
states that adopted Rule 8.2(a)).
181 See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
182 Rules governing the legal profession are typically given the power of law through
adoption by a state’s highest court. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that American
courts have generally “asserted the affirmative power to regulate the legal profession” from
bar admission to professional disciplinary regulation); Nelson & Hill, P.A. v. Wood, 537 S.E.2d
670, 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“The Supreme Court of Georgia has the duty to regulate the
legal profession in the public’s interest.” (citing AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 316
(Ga. 1994))); Jud. Qualifications Comm’n v. Lowenstein, 314 S.E.2d 107, 108 (Ga. 1984)
(“Courts have inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court
and to control and supervise the practice of law generally . . . .” (citing Wallace v. Wallace,
166 S.E.2d 718, 723 (Ga. 1969))).
183 See supra note 29; see also GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(b) (2021) (“A lawyer having
knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office should inform the appropriate
authority.”).
184 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1577 (discussing the importance of citizens being able
“to vote with informed judgment,” which supports the argument for greater free-speech rights
for lawyers).
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truthful and relevant to the fair administration of justice. The rule
likely curtails improper criticism as well, which is a good thing, but
is that benefit worth the cost of potentially restraining proper,
necessary speech? Presumably, Georgia thought not.
Whatever the rationale for Georgia’s approach to lawyers’
critiques of judges, its chosen course is the right one. From a
professional responsibility perspective, there are times when
judicial criticism is not only appropriate, but necessary. Unduly
hamstringing those best situated to comment harms the system,
rather than protects its sanctity. The prospect of criticism may deter
judicial misconduct. And reverence for judges is not always
warranted. Circumstances may dictate that the only available
recourse for fulfilling a lawyer’s professional obligations to a client,
and to the public at large, is to shine a spotlight on a judge’s actions
through extrajudicial criticism.185 This is the position in which the
plaintiffs’ lawyers found themselves in Barrow v. Raffensperger.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE LAWYERS’ CRITICISM IN BARROW V.
RAFFENSPERGER
A. THE ETHICAL PROPRIETY OF THE LAWYERS’ JUDICIAL
CRITICISM

Although Georgia’s attorney regulatory regime seems to accord
great deference to the free-speech rights of lawyers, particularly as
evidenced by its refusal to adopt Rule 8.2(a),186 at least three other
rules of professional conduct may be implicated by the lawyers’
criticism in Raffensperger—namely, Rules 3.1(a), 4.1(a), and
8.4(a)(4).187 Rule 3.1(a) provides that “[i]n the representation of a
Cf. supra note 15.
See supra notes 142–148 and accompanying text.
187 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(a), r. 4.1(a), r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021). It should be noted
that Rule 3.6 could also come into play regarding judicial criticism, but given that rule’s
requirement that a lawyer must “know[] or reasonably should know that [the lawyer’s
statements] will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding,” it is difficult to see how the lawyers’ comments in Raffensperger would fall within
the rule’s scope. GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 (2021). The Raffensperger lawyers were
criticizing the actual decisionmakers for remaining on the case, which does not seem capable
of materially prejudicing the proceeding by affecting its fairness to the parties. Rule 3.6(a) is
185
186
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client, a lawyer shall not . . . file a suit, assert a position, conduct a
defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client
when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.”188 This
provision seems to cover harassing or malicious statements by a
lawyer about a judge made in the context of a representation.
Criticizing a judge’s decision certainly appears to fall within “action
[taken] on behalf of the client,”189 but the intent of the lawyer and
nature of the remarks will determine whether there has been a
violation.
Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(a)(4) both impose a duty of honesty and
therefore can be violated only if judicial criticism is false.190 In
representing a client, a lawyer is prohibited under Rule 4.1(a) from
making “a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person.”191 It is important to emphasize that the false statement
must be material for there to be a violation,192 a limitation that may
often place a lawyer’s judicial criticism beyond the rule’s intended
proscription. Rule 8.4(a)(4), on the other hand, can be violated even
by a lawyer who is not representing a client in a matter, but he or
she must be acting in a professional capacity.193 As the rule states:
“It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”194 Untruthful
statements by lawyers critical of judges, whether made to the media
or some other third party, at least create the possibility that a
lawyer could be subject to discipline for such commentary,
depending upon whether or not the act of criticizing is viewed as
“professional conduct.” Moreover, the State Bar’s premium on First

designed more to address such things as a lawyer discussing publicly evidence that he or she
knows will be inadmissible at trial or a lawyer commenting on the criminal record of a party.
See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) cmt. 5A (2021) (“There are, on the other hand,
certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a
proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter,
or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration.”).
188 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
189 Id.
190 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) & r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021).
191 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (2021).
192 Id.
193 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021).
194 Id. (emphasis added).
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Amendment protection of lawyers must be kept in mind in assessing
the potential for discipline under any of these rules.
In considering the ethical propriety of the statements made by
the lawyers in Raffensperger, it is instructive to categorize their
remarks by nature and content. The pertinent judicial criticism can
be separated into four distinct groups: (1) criticism of a judge’s
decision, (2) criticism that calls into question the legitimacy of a
judge’s motivation for a decision, (3) criticism of the manner in
which a judge carries out his or her judicial responsibilities, and (4)
personal attacks on a judge.
Generally, as to the first category—criticism of a judicial
decision—the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that this type of
commentary does not necessarily impugn judicial integrity.195
Specifically, in In re Sawyer, writing for a plurality, Justice
Brennan maintained that if the judge who was the alleged target of
the criticism in the case “was said to be wrong on his law, it is no
matter; appellate courts and law reviews say that of judges daily,
and it imputes no disgrace. . . . The public attribution of honest
error to the judiciary is no cause for professional discipline.”196
Under this reasoning, one could argue that even if Rule 8.2(a) had
been adopted in Georgia, it would not be violated when lawyers
merely question the correctness of a judicial decision. Furthermore,
this type of criticism would not run afoul of Rule 3.1(a), 4.1(a), or
8.4(a)(4), especially to the extent it was delivered in a measured
fashion.
A number of the statements made by the lawyers in
Raffensperger appear to fall within this first category of judicial
criticism and therefore were ethically proper, whether or not
practically well-advised. For example, Lester Tate’s critique of the
three non-recusing justices was essentially aimed at the perceived
incorrectness of their decision and their failure to provide any
explanation therefor.197 Michael Moore likewise made some
statements that were largely directed at the alleged erroneous

See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 634–35 (1959) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing
between comments that impugn judicial integrity and those that criticize the law and
disfavored judicial outcomes).
196 Id. at 635; see also Wendel, supra note 30, at 331–32 (observing that “attribution of
honest error to judges does not impute disgrace — after all, appellate courts and academic
commentators accuse judges of error on a daily basis”).
197 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
195
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nature of the justices’ decision, although his remarks were definitely
of a more pointed variety and highlighted the potential negative
effects of the precedent the justices were setting.198 Specifically,
Moore expressed concern that, going forward, Georgia judges may
“no longer be expected to act without the appearance of
impropriety.”199 That statement, however, is hard to question under
the governing rules because—in law-review fashion—it simply sets
forth the basis for the overarching critique. The comments made by
Cary Ichter, Beth Beskin’s attorney, also fell well within the range
of acceptable criticism according to any plausible standard.200 His
statements focused on the merits of the litigation itself, rather than
the non-recusal decision, and did no more than question the
correctness of the court’s ruling, together with the future impact it
might have, without focusing, caustically or otherwise, on any
individual justice.201
The second and third categories—criticism of decisional
motivation and the manner in which a judge fulfills official duties—
seem to overlap. In particular, when a lawyer criticizes a judge for
the alleged motivation behind a decision, that statement will
typically carry with it at least an implication that a judge is not
executing professional responsibilities in an appropriate manner. In
re Wilkins, an Indiana Supreme Court case with parallels to
Raffensperger, illustrates the point.202 This disciplinary case arose
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
200 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text; see also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 634
(noting that a factor militating against the suspension of a lawyer for judicial criticism was
that the individual judge was not mentioned by name and that none of the lawyer’s
complaints was phrased as implicating the judge individually); Lieberman, supra note 29, at
791 (observing that “while statements that gratuitously demean the judicial system should
be avoided, attacks are far more harmful and cause far more disrespect when directed at
individual judges, who do not have the means to defend themselves”).
202 In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003). It should be noted that the Indiana Supreme
Court issued two opinions in this disciplinary matter. In the first, it determined that Wilkins
had violated Rule 8.2(a) and imposed a thirty-day suspension. See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d
714, 717, 719 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (“We find that his comments . . . violated [Rule] 8.2(a)
because they were made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity concerning the
integrity of a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals.”). The case came before the court a
second time on Wilkins’s motion for rehearing regarding the finding of a violation, as well as
the level of discipline imposed. In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d at 986–87. The court partially
198
199
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out of an effort to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court an appeal
that had been decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals on the
ground that the lower court’s decision “erroneously and materially
misstate[d] the record.”203 In a brief submitted to the supreme court
in support of transfer, Wilkins included a footnote204 that directly
called into question the motivation behind the lower court’s decision
in the matter, which stated,
Indeed, the [Court of Appeals] Opinion is so factually
and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder
whether the Court of Appeals was determined to find
for Appellee Sports, Inc., and then said whatever was
necessary to reach that conclusion (regardless of
whether the facts or the law supported its decision).205
Clearly, both the motivation for the appeals court’s decision and
the manner in which that court fulfilled its duties were the targets
of Wilkins’s criticism. The Indiana Supreme Court found that these
comments violated Rule 8.2(a) “because they were made with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity concerning the integrity
of a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals.”206 Notably, the
supreme court was sharply condemnatory of Wilkins’s conduct,
observing that the offending footnote
ascribes bias and favoritism to the [Court of Appeals]
judges[,] . . . and it implies that these judges
manufactured a false rationale in an attempt to justify
their pre-conceived desired outcome. These aspersions
granted the rehearing and reduced Wilkins’s discipline to a public reprimand but let its
previous finding of a violation stand. Id.
203 In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 715.
204 Interestingly, Wilkins was apparently only local counsel in the case. The brief and the
offending footnote were drafted by primary out-of-state counsel. However, Wilkins worked on
and signed the brief and therefore was equally responsible for its content, and as an Indianalicensed attorney, was subject to the rules and disciplinary authority of the Indiana Bar. See
id. (“Even though the respondent did not necessarily author the words at issue here (a task
admittedly performed by Michigan counsel), the respondent signed the brief pursuant to Ind.
Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2)(d), and was thus ‘jointly responsible therefore.’”).
205 In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d at 986 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Wilkins, 777
N.E.2d at 716).
206 In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 717.
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transgress the wide latitude given appellate argument,
and they clearly impugn the integrity of a judge in
violation of . . . Rule 8.2(a).207
For his criticism, Wilkins was initially suspended from practice for
thirty days,208 but the discipline was later reduced to a public
reprimand.209
Though the Indiana Supreme Court’s ability to render an
impartial decision in this disciplinary matter was apparently not
questioned by Wilkins, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that the
court’s ultimate determination may have been affected by the fact
that judicial colleagues were the targets of the criticism.210 This
latter point was the principal basis for the lawyers’ comments about
the justices’ motivation in Raffensperger, and like in Wilkins, such
remarks carried with them, either directly or by implication, the
additional accusation that the justices were not fulfilling their
judicial responsibilities.211 Specifically, the lawyers, to varying
degrees, questioned the motivation of Justices Blackwell, Melton,
Nahmias, and Warren with regard to their conduct related to the
case.212
The criticism of Justice Blackwell arose from the manner in
which he chose to resign, an approach that precipitated the very
legal dispute at issue in Raffensperger—i.e., whether the secretary
of state should have been required to hold an election
notwithstanding Justice Blackwell’s carefully timed, prospective
resignation. As noted previously, Barrow’s attorney, Michael Moore,

In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d at 986.
See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 719 (finding that a thirty-day suspension was justified
because of Wilkins’s “failure to express remorse”).
209 See In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d at 987 (finding that Wilkins’s “exemplary record for
honesty, integrity, and truthfulness” warranted a reduction of his sanction).
210 See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 720 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (“This Court acts as judge,
jury, and appellate reviewer in a disciplinary proceeding. . . . Where the offense consists of
criticism of the judiciary, we become the victim as well.”).
211 See, e.g., McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21 (“[Justice Nahmias] can’t be the judge
of a case involving a close colleague, and he can’t be the judge of his own case . . . . But that’s
just what he’s doing.”).
212 Compare McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50 (reporting
Moore’s claim that the justices wished to “protect[] a judicial pension”), with McDonald, Slow
Walking, supra note 21 (reporting Barrow’s claim that the justices were trying to “suppress
the vote”).
207
208
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asserted that Justice Blackwell’s resignation strategy “[gave] the
appearance that a group of insiders [had] determined that handselecting a justice and protecting a judicial pension [were] more
important than protecting the people of Georgia’s right to vote.”213
Similarly, appellant Barrow himself suggested that Justice
Blackwell and the governor manipulated the system to ensure that
the governor would fill the vacant seat by appointment: “[Justice
Nahmias was] trying to manipulate the substitute justices . . . for
the same reason Justice Blackwell and the governor ha[d]
manipulated the timing of Justice Blackwell’s ‘retirement’—to
control the Georgia Supreme Court.”214
To be sure, both of these statements convey the belief that Justice
Blackwell’s motivation for resigning was influenced by a desire to
empower the Republican governor to appoint his successor and that
this was a manipulative scheme intended to deprive Georgia
citizens of their right to elect justices.215 While strongly worded, the
essence of the accusation—that Justice Blackwell timed his
resignation so as to enable Governor Brian Kemp to appoint his
replacement—is likely accurate, and the fact that he may have done
this should come as no surprise. It is commonplace throughout the
United States for judges to time their retirements with
consideration of their likely successors in mind.216 Accordingly, a
resigning justice who had been appointed by a Democratic governor
could be expected to plan resignation, if possible, to allow a
Democratic governor to appoint the next justice.217 Hence, the real
potential issue with Moore and Barrow’s statements is their
accusatory tone and the suggestion that Justice Blackwell was
doing something, from a motivational standpoint, that was out of
the ordinary or inherently wrong.218 Though disparaging and
McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50.
McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21.
215 McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50; McDonald, Slow
Walking, supra note 21.
216 See, e.g., David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial Retirement Strategies: The Judge’s
Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM. POL. Q. 458, 458 (2000) (“If
judges are politically strategic, they may try to retire at times that maximize the chances that
an ideologically compatible successor will be appointed.”).
217 See id. at 461 (“Perhaps the best way to continue one’s own policy legacy is to ensure an
ideologically similar replacement.”).
218 McDonald & Land, Teeing Up Potential Conflict, supra note 50; McDonald, Slow
Walking, supra note 21.
213
214
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perhaps even hypocritical, this line of criticism seems to not only
fall outside of Georgia’s ethics rules but also to be protected by the
First Amendment.
Consider Garrison v. Louisiana, a case finding unconstitutional
a criminal contempt statute under which a prosecutor was charged
for publicly criticizing state court judges. 219 In Garrison, the
prosecutor attributed a significant backlog of criminal cases and his
inability to obtain funds for undercover vice investigations to the
laziness, inefficiency, and, perhaps, corrupt motives of eight
judges.220 In particular, he stated,
The judges have now made it eloquently clear where
their sympathies lie in regard to aggressive vice
investigations by refusing to authorize use of the DA’s
funds to pay for the cost of closing down the Canal
Street clip joints. . . . This raises interesting questions
about the racketeer influences on our eight vacationminded judges.221
In finding that it was unconstitutional to subject the prosecutor to
criminal contempt for his remarks, the U.S. Supreme Court
observed, “Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for
office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation.”222
Along the same lines, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court
emphasized that in making statements of this nature factual errors
are likely.223 As the Court put it, “Errors of fact, particularly in

219 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (finding that the statute “incorporate[d] constitutionally invalid
standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of public officials”).
220 See id. at 65–66 (“The principal charges alleged to be defamatory were his attribution
of a large backlog of pending criminal cases to the inefficiency, laziness, and excessive
vacations of the judges . . . .”).
221 Id. at 66.
222 Id. at 77 (emphasis added); see also In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“Some judges are dishonest; their identification and removal is a matter of high priority in
order to promote a justified public confidence in the judicial system.”); Tarkington, supra note
29, at 1605 (observing that “[g]enerally, people do not really know what motivates others, but
improper motivation is an important factor in measuring the fitness of government officials”).
223 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
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regard to a man’s mental states and processes, are inevitable.”224
Hence, from a constitutional perspective, it seems clear that Moore
and Barrow were on solid ground.
Moreover, on their face, the lawyers’ statements do not appear to
fall within Rule 3.1(a), 4.1(a), or 8.4(a)(4).225 First, even if Moore and
Barrow’s speculation about Justice Blackwell’s motivation was
wrong, it cannot reasonably be characterized as knowingly false, nor
were their statements made with the intent “merely to harass or
maliciously injure.”226 They were clearly reactions to the
circumstances presented, albeit strongly-worded and denigrating.
Second, Barrow was a party in the action, not counsel, and on that
basis alone, his comments were not covered by Rule 3.1(a) or 4.1(a),
which only apply to lawyers when representing clients.227 In
addition, his statements were most likely beyond the reach of Rule
8.4(a)(4) as well because they were made outside of the context of
what would typically be characterized as “professional conduct.”228
The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the criticism
lodged at the three non-recusing justices, which not only challenged
the justices’ motivation for their failure to recuse but also suggested
that this decision reflected adversely on their abilities to carry out
their judicial responsibilities.229 Lester Tate, one of Barrow’s
lawyers, indicated that he was “shocked” that the three justices
would not recuse themselves given that the majority of their

Id.; see also Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir.
1995) (“Lawyers may freely voice criticisms supported by a reasonable factual basis even if
they turn out to be mistaken.”).
225 See supra notes 188–194 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 194 and accompanying text; see also In re Palazzola, 853 S.E.2d 99, 108
(Ga. 2020) (observing that the “phrase [‘professional conduct’] is not so capacious as to
encompass everything a lawyer does in the management of a law office (or for that matter, in
life)”). Although in Palazzola the Georgia Supreme Court declined to interpret the meaning
of “professional conduct” in the context of the types of deceptive conduct related to law
practice management that would be prohibited, the opinion nevertheless supports the view
that the phrase connotes a requirement that the conduct in question be associated in some
way with the actual practice of law. Id. at 101, 108–10.
It should be noted, however, that one can argue that Barrow was holding himself out as a
lawyer or judicial candidate in making his remarks, thus qualifying as “professional conduct.”
Nevertheless, even if that is correct, Barrow still did not violate Rule 8.4(a)(4) for the other
reasons discussed.
229 See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text.
224
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colleagues had done so.230 He also expressed concern over the
justices’ failure to provide any explanation to the public for their
non-recusal and maintained that this omission, coupled with their
remaining on the case, was “inconsistent with principles of openness
and impartiality” and the very rules regarding recusal that “Justice
Nahmias, himself, has set down for other judges to abide by.”231
Barrow’s other attorney, Michael Moore, was more direct in terms
of questioning the justices’ motivation for non-recusal, stating that
they had “gone to great lengths to hang onto a case about their
friend’s seat” and maintaining that, under the same circumstances,
“every other judge in the state would have unquestionably” been
disqualified.232 Moore went on to predict the troubling effect of the
justices’ decision for the future of the Georgia judiciary and asserted
that, as a result of their example, “Georgia judges will no longer be
expected to act without the appearance of impropriety.”233
The criticism by Moore and Tate of Justices Melton, Nahmias,
and Warren is unquestionably more biting and accusatory than that
directed toward Justice Blackwell. Nevertheless, the criticisms
appear to have been safely within the lawyers’ First Amendment
rights as recognized in Georgia, and there is nothing about the
remarks that goes beyond what seems acceptable under Rules
3.1(a), 4.1(a), and 8.4(a)(4). Indeed, their comments actually appear
to have been expressions of opinion and thus not sanctionable for
embodying false statements of fact.234 It is true that they could not
know for sure what was in the minds of the three justices in deciding
to remain on the case, but that is not constitutionally relevant;235
and so long as their statements were not knowingly false or

McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
Id.
232 Galloway, supra note 20.
233 McDonald, Court Splits in Recusing, supra note 17.
234 Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting
that “statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment unless they ‘imply a false
assertion of fact’”) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990))); In re Palmisano,
70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Even a statement cast in the form of an opinion . . . implies
a factual basis, and the lack of support for that implied factual assertion may be a proper
basis for a penalty.”).
235 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting the need to protect
speech to foster “uninhibited” public debate).
230
231

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/4

52

Brown: Criticizing Judges

2021]

CRITICIZING JUDGES

213

intended merely to harass or maliciously injure the justices, the
ethics rules do not come into play either.236
John Barrow’s criticism of the three non-recusing justices was
the harshest and therefore the most likely to be ethically
improper.237 His statements were not only critical of the justices’
motivation and ability to fulfill their responsibilities; they also
involved what could be viewed as a personal attack on Justice
Nahmias. First, in terms of motivation, Barrow maintained that the
delay in issuing a decision in the case was an intentional ploy by the
three justices inspired by politics, i.e., a deliberate effort to allow
the governor to appoint a Republican justice.238 In addition,
although he questioned the propriety of all three justices remaining
on the case, he was especially critical of Justice Nahmias, asserting
that Nahmias “is notorious for his attempts to dominate the Court”
and arguing that his non-recusal violated the code of judicial
conduct because he was judging “a case involving a close
colleague.”239
The latter point regarding the propriety of non-recusal was
equally applicable to the other two justices, but Barrow did not
direct this criticism at them, underscoring the personal nature of
his critique of Justice Nahmias.240 Although this choice surely
suggests that Barrow had stronger feelings about Justice Nahmias’s
conduct, the individualized nature of his remarks does not make
them any more likely to violate the ethics rules. Besides being
mostly opinion-based, the statements generally did not seem to
facially violate the applicable rules in terms of the type of conduct
required: they were not solely intended to harass or maliciously
injure, and the falseness and materiality of the statements was, at
most, debatable.241 More importantly, Barrow was not acting in a
236 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(a) (2021) (prohibiting behavior that “harass[es]
or maliciously injure[s]”); GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (2021) (prohibiting knowingly
making false statements of material fact); GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(4) (2021)
(prohibiting “professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”).
237 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
238 See McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21; see also supra notes 75–76 and
accompanying text.
239 McDonald, Slow Walking, supra note 21.
240 See id. (naming Justice Nahmias specifically as “the high court’s liaison to the state
judicial watchdog agency, [who] is violating the state Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to
recuse”).
241 See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text.
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representational capacity when he uttered his judicial criticism and
thus was not subject to the reach of the pertinent rules of
professional conduct. For this same reason, the biting appraisal of
the justices offered by attorney Thomas Stubbs, who simply
commented as an outside observer, did not subject him to potential
professional discipline either.242
It is important to note, though, that as a judicial candidate,243
Barrow was not subject only to the rules of professional conduct; he
was also subject to Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct.244 Could it
be that his statements violated some provision of that Code?
B. THE ETHICAL PROPRIETY OF JOHN BARROW’S CRITICISM UNDER
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

While, as a lawyer, John Barrow is always governed by the rules
of professional conduct, when he announced his intention to run for
Justice Blackwell’s soon-to-be-vacated seat, he became a “judicial
candidate,” and thereby also subjected himself to regulation under
the code of judicial conduct.245 Indeed, some of Barrow’s comments
criticizing the justices were plainly in the nature of campaigning,
made to emphasize why he was personally better qualified to be a
justice and deserved to be elected: “When I’m on the Supreme Court,
nobody—no Democrat, Republican, Independent, man, woman, or
child—will have to fear that their case is being manipulated or ‘slow
walked’ for political ends.”246
Interestingly, Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct includes a rule
that not only encompasses the substance of Model Rule 8.2(a) but
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology (2021) (defining “judicial candidate” as “a
person, including an incumbent judge, seeking selection for or retention in judicial office by
election or appointment. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon as he or she:
(1) appoints or forms a campaign committee, (2) makes a public announcement of candidacy,
(3) declares, files or qualifies as a candidate with the election or appointment authority, or
(4) authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions or support.”).
244 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(b) (2021) (“A lawyer who is a candidate for
judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”);
GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 3 (2021) (“The Code of Judicial Conduct establishes
standards for ethical conduct of judges and judicial candidates.”).
245 See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(b) (2021) (“A lawyer who is a candidate for
judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”).
246 Galloway et al., supra note 21.
242
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actually goes further, at least in constraining campaign-related
speech—specifically, Rule 4.2(A)(3) provides that
[j]udicial candidates . . . shall not use or participate in
the publication of a false statement of fact, or make any
misleading statement concerning themselves or their
candidacies, or concerning any opposing judicial
candidate or candidacy, with knowledge of the
statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for the
statement’s truth or falsity.247
Hence, like Model Rule 8.2(a), Georgia Judicial Code Rule
4.2(A)(3) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making
statements known to be false or with reckless disregard for the
statements’ truth or falsity.248 Unlike Rule 8.2(a), however, Rule
4.2(A)(3) is not limited to statements concerning a judge’s
“qualifications or integrity.”249 In addition, it reaches further beyond
the scope of Rule 8.2(a) insofar as it applies to false or reckless
statements that candidates make about themselves, not just
statements about others. Given the emphasis in Georgia on the
importance of the First Amendment for lawyers, it seems somewhat
odd that the state’s code of judicial conduct includes such a
provision, especially in light of the ostensibly conscious decision to
omit a parallel rule for lawyers generally in the rules of professional
conduct.250 After all, one might think that free-speech interests are
at their highest importance in the context of intense and open
efforts to contend for public office.251 Moreover, it is noteworthy that
Georgia’s Rule 4.2(A)(3) departs from its closest counterpart in the
GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021) (emphasis added).
Id.
249 Compare MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall
not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .”), with GA. CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021) (providing that judicial candidates “shall not use or
participate in the publication of a false statement of fact, or make any misleading statement
concerning themselves or their candidacies, or concerning any opposing judicial candidate or
candidacy, with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for the
statement’s truth or falsity” (emphases added)).
250 See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
251 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1576, 1576 n.48 (citing theories regarding the central
nature of political speech in First Amendment jurisprudence).
247
248
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ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.1(A)(11).252 That rule
states, in pertinent part, that “a judge or a judicial candidate shall
not . . . knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make
any false or misleading statement.”253 Thus, the Model Code is
textually broader insofar as it applies not simply to “judicial
candidates” but also to judges who are not necessarily running for
re-election.254
The dichotomy between Georgia’s treatment of a lawyer’s
criticism of a judge and a judicial candidate’s criticism of an
opponent is difficult to reconcile; though, perhaps one could argue
that candidates for office have greater incentive to twist the truth,
thus making campaign speech more worrisome as a general matter
and less worthy of protection. While plausible, this argument is
hardly compelling. A more likely explanation for the lack of
parallelism between the rules may be that it resulted from simple
oversight. But, whatever the reason, the fact of the matter is that
there is a rule in Georgia that expressly applied to John Barrow’s
statements about the justices, and the question is: Did he violate it?
I think the answer is that he clearly did not.
First, none of Barrow’s criticism of the three non-recusing
justices was even covered by Rule 4.2(A)(3). In particular, the rule
only applies to statements “concerning [candidates] or their
candidacies” or “concerning any opposing judicial candidate or
candidacy.”255 Barrow was running for the seat that Justice
Blackwell was vacating, and as such, he was not running against
Justice Melton, Justice Nahmias, or Justice Warren.256 Therefore,
anything that he said about them that might otherwise have run
afoul of Rule 4.2(A)(3)’s proscription would still not be a violation.257
Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in the previous section,258 it

See supra note 154.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(11) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
254 Id. Notably, the Model Code definition of “judicial candidate” includes a “sitting judge,
who is seeking selection for or retention in judicial office by election or appointment.” MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
255 GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021) (emphasis added).
256 See Barrow v. Raffensperger, 842 S.E.2d 884, 887 (2020) (identifying John Barrow and
Elizabeth A. Beskin as the candidates running for Justice Blackwell’s seat).
257 See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021) (prohibiting intentionally or
recklessly misleading or false statements about judicial candidates).
258 See supra Section V.A.
252
253
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seems difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the statements
would rise to the level of a facial violation, even if the rule applied.259
The same conclusion applies to Barrow’s statements about
Justice Blackwell. Like the three non-recusing justices, Justice
Blackwell was also not an “opposing judicial candidate.”260 In
addition, the comments that Barrow made about him, though harsh,
were not demonstrably false or even objectively so.261 Finally, it
seems clear that to the extent Barrow was making statements about
himself in criticizing the justices, those statements too, whether or
not “misleading,” were not knowingly false or made with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity, even when judged by an objective
standard. For example, Barrow’s campaign promise that he would
not “slow walk” cases for political reasons cannot be proven false,
nor can it rationally be characterized as reckless. At worst, it was
mere campaign hyperbole and certainly not something that should
subject any candidate to professional censure.
Hence, none of the judicial criticism related to Raffensperger
should expose the lawyers involved to any potential professional
discipline under the rules of professional conduct, nor the code of
judicial conduct, and that is as it should be, especially in the context
of judicial decisions concerning recusal. In fact, not only should
lawyers be permitted to criticize judges in such matters, but they
also often have a professional responsibility to do so in the interest
of their clients and, perhaps more importantly, the public.

VI. CONCLUSION: A LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO CRITICIZE JUDGES
While judges are entitled to respect, they are rightly subject to
public scrutiny and should be no more immune from criticism than

See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text.
GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2(A)(3) (2021).
261 Surprisingly, the comments to Rule 4.2 expressly state that, notwithstanding the
subjective tone of the blackletter text, an objective standard should be utilized in determining
whether the rule has been violated. See GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2021) (“The
determination of whether a judicial candidate knows of falsity or recklessly disregards the
truth or falsity of his or her public communication is an objective one.”).
259
260

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

57

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

218

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:161

any other individual holding a government position.262 Indeed,
because judges in most states are elected in some fashion,263 citizens
need to be informed about the qualifications of candidates in order
to decide how to cast their votes.264 Furthermore, because of the
indispensable role that the judiciary plays in the administration of
our justice system and the necessity of fairness within that system,
both in fact and perception, it is appropriate to carefully scrutinize
judges’ performances and to publicly share information bearing on
their fitness to serve.
Rule 8.2(a) and its predecessors have been utilized to restrain
lawyers from actively participating in the public debate regarding
the qualifications and integrity of judges,265 reputedly for the
purpose of preserving “public confidence in the administration of
justice.”266 The rule, on its face, prohibits only knowingly false
statements and those made with reckless disregard for their truth
or falsity.267 In reality, however, the rule’s application of an objective
reasonableness standard, rather than a subjective one,
encompasses far more in terms of judicial criticism.268 Instead of
preserving public confidence, such an approach operates to
undermine that purported goal. Those best suited to critique
judicial performance are essentially silenced, thus depriving the
electorate of valuable information to guide its voting choices. In
jurisdictions where judges are appointed—at the federal level and

262 See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 669 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Certainly
courts are not, and cannot be, immune from criticism, and lawyers, of course, may indulge in
criticism.”); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1941) (observing that
shielding judges from criticism is not the proper approach and would likely create greater
contempt for the judicial process).
263 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., JUDICIAL SELECTION: SIGNIFICANT FIGURES (2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significantfigures (discussing the fact that 39 states use “some form of election at some level of court”).
264 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1577 (“Speech regarding members of the judiciary or
their decisions is patently relevant to self-governance.”).
265 See id. at 1569 n.6 (describing the propensity of courts to rely on Rule 8.2 to “punish
attorney speech impugning judicial integrity”).
266 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
267 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
268 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1588–89 (noting that “state courts have almost
universally disciplined attorneys under a reasonableness standard”); see also supra notes
126–128 and accompanying text.
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in a number of states269—there is still a need for an informed public
to hold accountable those elected officials responsible for judicial
appointments.270
In rejecting Rule 8.2(a) and its overly-restrictive application to
lawyers, both Georgia and the District of Columbia have
appropriately accorded primacy to lawyers’ free-speech rights in the
interest of enhancing judicial accountability, thus helping to foster
public confidence in the judiciary.271 Without this form of freedom,
lawyers cannot effectively fulfill their ethical obligations to advocate
competently, diligently, and zealously on behalf of their clients, nor
can they satisfy their broader duty to the public to ensure fairness
and impartiality in the judicial system.272 Barrow v. Raffensperger
exemplifies the importance of having a free-speech-centered
philosophy with regard to criticism of judges by lawyers. The
lawyers in that case, in a very literal sense, had no judicial recourse
to advocate on behalf of their clients once the three justices declined
to recuse themselves. As discussed, non-recusal decisions by justices
of the Georgia Supreme Court are not generally subject to appellate
review, and resort to extraordinary relief, such as mandamus, is not
possible either.273 Accordingly, the objecting lawyers’ only
alternative consistent with their professional responsibility to their
clients was to engage in extrajudicial criticism of the justices. By
speaking out in this fashion, these lawyers were also able to satisfy
their critical obligation as public citizens, embodied in the Preamble
to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, to “seek improvement
of the law, . . . the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession.”274

269 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 263 (noting that “[a]ppointments are also a
common aspect of judicial selection” and discussing various ways states appoint judges).
270 See Tarkington, supra note 29, at 1577 (“Even as to appointed judges, the citizenry
perform[s] self-governance in selecting representatives responsible for appointing judges and
can call upon those representatives to use their power to address concerns.”).
271 See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 11–12, 93–94 and accompanying text.
274 GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 5 (2021); see also Wendel, supra note 30, at
333 (“Silencing lawyers’ criticism of the law and those who administer it interferes with the
long-established ‘rebellious’ dimension of the lawyer’s social function. Lawyers are supposed
to give voice to dissenters, outsiders, and unpopular clients and challenge the exercise of state
power.”).
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Other jurisdictions should follow the lead of Georgia and the
District of Columbia by eliminating Rule 8.2(a) in its entirety.
Taking this step will not give lawyers the unfettered ability to say
whatever they want about members of the judiciary because other
rules of professional conduct impose reasonable limitations; for
example, Rule 4.1(a) prohibits lawyers from making materially false
statements of fact or law to third persons.275 In addition, when the
statements relate to ongoing judicial proceedings in which lawyers
are involved, Rule 3.6 proscribes extrajudicial commentary that has
“a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” the
proceeding.276
Apart from the ethics rules, the flipside of the First Amendment
will create opportunities to sanction wrongful lawyer speech.
Specifically, not all speech is protected.277 For example, statements
that create a “clear and present danger to the administration of
justice” may subject a lawyer to censure.278 Furthermore, as
established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v.
Louisiana, false statements about judges, or those made with
reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, are likewise not
protected.279 Lawyers who make such statements may properly be
penalized and/or otherwise subject to civil liability. Indeed, in
keeping with the principles established in Sullivan and Garrison,
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also MODEL RULES
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”).
276 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Most states have
versions similar to Model Rule 3.6. See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM.,
VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 3.6 (2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/m
rpc-3-6.pdf (noting that twenty-one states have identical rules to Model Rule 3.6, twentyeight states have variations of Model Rule 3.6, and one state did not adopt Model Rule 3.6).
277 See, e.g., Garland v. State, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133–34 (Ga. 1985) (finding that
contemptuous statements are not constitutionally protected at the federal or state level).
278 See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[L]awyers’ statements unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be sanctioned
only if they pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.”); see also
Garland, 325 S.E.2d at 133 (“[T]he test applied to determine whether a statement is
contemptuous is whether there is a clear and present danger to orderly administration of
justice . . . .”).
279 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that public
officials can recover for defamation if they establish “actual malice” by the speaker); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65–67 (1964) (applying the “actual malice” standard to criminal
libel).
275
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states that are unwilling to discard Rule 8.2(a) could still accord
lawyers greater freedom to criticize judges by simply honoring the
rule’s textual requirement of knowing or reckless falsity, rather
than reading into the provision an “objective reasonableness”
standard.280
Even when lawyers are accorded significant freedom to criticize
judges, as in Georgia and the District of Columbia, they should
typically do so in a professional, respectful manner.281
Professionalism within the bar is usually promoted through
aspirational rules, oaths, continuing education programs,
reputational concerns, and professional lore. Georgia has an
aspirational “Lawyer’s Creed,” under which, among other things, a
lawyer pledges to courts and tribunals “respect, candor, and
courtesy.”282 In conjunction with this Creed, there is also an
“Aspirational Statement on Professionalism,” part of which focuses
on a lawyer’s conduct directed toward the judiciary.283 Specifically,
the Statement exhorts lawyers to strive “[t]o model for others the
respect due to our courts” by “[a]void[ing] unfounded,
unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the
judiciary.”284 Clearly, lawyers should endeavor to adhere to these
noble principles. Yet, it is important to emphasize that these are not
blackletter mandates. Nor should they be. There may be times when
lawyers need to condemn judicial action in strong terms, depending
upon the nature of the act being criticized, and they should be able
to do so without running the risk of facing formal sanctions.
Nevertheless, the aspirational goals will have some impact on
lawyers in terms of whether and how they choose to criticize judges,
as will various practical considerations.285 For example, a lawyer

280 See In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 847 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that the principles established in Sullivan and Garrison “amply protect the public
from defamatory statements by lawyers about judges”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 27,
at 861, 885‒87 (arguing for application of Sullivan standard to statements by lawyers in
assessing when they can be proscribed).
281 See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 (1985) (explaining the need for “a professional
and civil tone” when lawyers criticize the justice system).
282 Lawyer’s Creed, STATE BAR GA.,
https://www.gabar.org/aboutthebar/lawrelatedorganizations/cjcp/lawyers-creed.cfm (last
visited Nov. 23, 2021).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 See supra note 29.
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must always be mindful that the judge to be criticized may be the
ultimate decision maker in a case. This is particularly true in the
context of recusal. If one goes overboard in arguing for a judge’s
recusal, and that effort fails, the lawyer will be forced to move
forward in the case with that very judge, who (in light of human
nature) may well become—whether consciously or unconsciously—
disinclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the characterquestioning movant. Moreover, even when criticizing lower court
judges on appeal, as in Wilkins, a lawyer would be wise to temper
that criticism to the extent reasonably possible to avoid eliciting a
reaction from the reviewing court that may be understandably
protective or deferential to fellow members of the bench who are
being criticized.286
Finally, the ultimate and most appropriate checks on lawyer
criticism of judges are responses to such criticism by other lawyers
in defense of the judge in question. As Justice Louis Brandeis
famously noted in Whitney v. California, “If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence.”287 This truism aptly captures what happened
in Raffensperger. In response to the harsh criticism leveled at
Justices Blackwell, Melton, Nahmias, and Warren, attorney
Richard Robbins authored an editorial defending those justices and
condemning both the content and tone of the lawyers’ criticism.288
Robbins’s efforts—whether or not one agrees with him—were
wholly consistent with the regulation of judicial criticism in
Georgia, which has historically included an exaltation for lawyers
to defend judges against “unjust criticism,” largely because of
restrictions on judges’ ability to defend themselves.289 In fact, even
though Georgia has declined to adopt Rule 8.2(a), it did include a
comment to its version of Rule 8.2 that reaffirms the importance of
286 See In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 720 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (Boehm, J., dissenting)
(observing that the “intemperate language” used by Wilkins “is very poor advocacy,
distracting as it does from the points that are sought to be made”).
287 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added), overruled in part
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Wendel, supra note 30, at 338 (observing
that the remedy for the public’s lack of information about judging and its tendency to be
“swayed by single-issue campaigns against particular judges” is “more speech, not
suppression of wrongheaded criticism of judges”).
288 See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
289 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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lawyers defending judges: “To maintain the fair and independent
administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue
traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.”290
Barrow v. Raffensperger illustrates well how Georgia’s judicialcriticism regulatory regime strikes a sound balance, permitting all
lawyers involved to effectively fulfill their professional
responsibility to their clients and the public. Open criticism of
judicial officials could and did take place, and so did responsive
counter-criticism directed at the complaining lawyers.291 Voters
were properly left to weigh these opposing accounts in assessing the
performance of key public officers. And that is how it should be in
regulating the work of lawyers distinctly duty bound to safeguard
the sanctity of the judicial process.

GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2 cmt. 3 (2021).
Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1058 (1991) (observing that “constraints
of professional responsibility and societal disapproval will act as sufficient safeguards in most
cases”).
290
291
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